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ABSTRACT 
 
The Constitutional Origins of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power.  (April 2011) 
 
 
Oliver Peter Thoma 
Department of Political Science 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. James R. Rogers 
Department of Political Science 
 
The question of the executive’s authority over foreign affairs has been debated 
constantly over the life of the Constitution.  Rather than try to discern the answer to this 
question from only the well-known Framers, this scholarly endeavor proposes to unlock 
the original understanding of the Constitution to the “citizens, polemicists, and 
convention delegates who participated in one way or another in ratification.” Recent 
scholarship in the nature of the executive’s foreign affair power has suffered from a 
lesser degree of scrutiny than other constitutional subjects.  Few scholars have addressed 
the original source of authority and legitimacy of the Constitution—its ratification—as a 
means of determining whether the modern presidency continues to abuse or respect the 
powers the Constitution has invested in it.  Those that have looked to the historical 
context of the Constitution’s ratification and believe that public sentiment toward the 
executive was more characterized by fear rather than want of energy have reached their 
conclusion because of select sampling from an extraordinary era in American 
constitutionalism.   
 
iv 
The research will be divided among three major historical periods of American 
constitutionalism: (1) the pre-revolutionary era (early 1700s until 1775) while America 
was still comprised of 13 British colonies and most constitutional concerns where 
focused on Parliament’s abuses of power and the Executive’s complicity; (2) the 
executive interregnum (1775 until the early 1780s) wherein the American public feared 
executive authority and experimented with a weak executive; and (3) the period of 
legislative fear (early 1780s to 1790s) that acted as a catalyst for James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton, and others to restore an energetic executive. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Controversy and debate have surrounded the executive’s exercise of foreign affairs 
powers—war power and treaty power—since the Washington administration.  President 
Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of April 22, 1793, which nullified the United 
States’ obligation to respond to France’s declaration of war against Great Britain and 
Holland as per the Treaty of Alliance with France of 1778, further exacerbated the 
political division between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison in the form of the 
Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794.  Two of the nation’s most influential 
Framers debated whether the executive had the authority to interpret and terminate 
obligations of a treaty without legislative consent, and this debate has echoed across the 
history of the American executive.  Morton J. Frisch (2007) described Hamilton’s belief 
that “the direction of foreign policy is essentially an executive function” by interpreting 
the “Senate’s treaty making and war powers as exceptions out of the general grant of 
power vested in the president” (xiii).  In 2002, President Bush unilaterally withdrew 
from the Statute of Rome, which established the International Criminal Court, as well as 
interpreted the Geneva Convention as being not applicable to al Qaeda operatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of Public Choice. 
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In 2011, President Obama actively intervened in Libya through covert operations and 
airstrikes without congressional approval.  Both presidents’ actions resurfaced the same 
debate over the extent of the executive’s foreign affairs power that had begun over 200 
years earlier in Hamilton and Madison’s time.   
 
The debate over the president’s war powers has also had a lengthy history.  “The United 
States has only declared war five times: during the War of 1812, the Mexican-American 
War of 1848, the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the two World Wars.  Yet the 
United States has committed military forces into hostilities abroad at least 125 times in 
the Constitution’s 207-year history” (Yoo 2005, 12).  The history of American war 
reveals that a congressional declaration of war is not the norm, rather the executive’s 
prerogative to engage in military action.  Although Congress could have refused to grant 
the funding required by the executive to wage war, it has never done so.  Harold Koh 
(1990) explains this interaction of the three branches as “executive initiative, 
congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance” (117).  Despite historical practice of 
executive dominance over foreign affairs, scholars are still divided as to the true nature 
of the executive’s authority over the foreign affairs power.  
 
According to John Yoo, the works of Louis Henkin, Harold Koh, John Hart Ely, Thomas 
Franck, and Michael Glennon are considered the dominant paradigm in American 
foreign affairs law.  These authors espouse the belief that “the Constitution requires the 
equal participation of Congress and the federal judiciary in national security decision 
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making” (Yoo 6).  This school of thought considers any executive initiation of military 
hostility or treaty interpretation unconstitutional if explicit congressional approval is not 
received.  On the other hand, scholars like John Yoo, Curtis Bradley, Sai Prakash, 
Michael Ramsey, and Jack Goldsmith challenge the dominant paradigm in American 
foreign affairs law.  These “revisionists” base their methodology on the “constitutional 
text, structure, and original understanding” (7).  Rather than pursue the elusive goal of 
discerning the Framers’ intent, this methodology advances a historical argument that 
analyzes the socio-political environment wherein the Constitution was ratified.   
 
John Yoo claims that “[b]ecause the approval of the state ratifying conventions gave the 
Constitution its life, the understanding of those who participated in the ratification 
should guide our interpretation of the text” (28).  Authors like Forrest McDonald and 
Jack Rakove have contributed immensely to scholars attempting to ascertain the original 
understanding of the delegates participating in the framing of the Constitution as well as 
the ratification debates.   “For the argument that the original meaning…should be 
binding presents…a rule of law.  It insists that original meaning should prevail…because 
the Constitution as supreme law rests on its ratification by the special, popularly elected 
conventions of 1787-88” (Rakove 1996, 9).   
 
Recent scholarship in the nature of the executive’s foreign affair power has suffered 
from a lesser degree of scrutiny than other constitutional subjects.  Few scholars have 
addressed the original source of authority and legitimacy of the Constitution—its 
4 
ratification—as a means of determining whether the modern presidency continues to 
abuse or respect the powers the Constitution has invested in it.  Those that have looked 
to the historical context of the Constitution’s ratification and believe that public 
sentiment toward the executive was more characterized by fear rather than want of 
energy have reached their conclusion because of select sampling from an extraordinary 
era in American constitutionalism.   
 
Hypothesis 
If the original understanding at the time of the Constitution’s ratification can be derived, 
the answer to whether the foreign affairs power was created as primarily an executive 
power can be discovered.  Assuming this original understanding is possible, this 
proposal advances the hypothesis that an original understanding of the Constitution’s 
ratification will reveal that the foreign affairs power was primarily invested in the 
executive but concurrent with the other branches of government. 
 
Methodology 
 In order to derive an original understanding of the Constitution’s ratification, this 
research will cast a wide net across the political theorists, legal doctrines, and socio-
political events that spurred the Constitution’s creation, ratification, and application.  
The research will be divided among three major historical periods of American 
constitutionalism: (1) the pre-revolutionary era (early 1700s until 1775) while America 
was still comprised of 13 British colonies and most constitutional concerns where 
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focused on Parliament’s abuses of power and the Executive’s complicity; (2) the 
executive interregnum (1775 until the early 1780s) wherein the American public feared 
executive authority and experimented with a weak executive; and (3) the period of 
legislative fear (early 1780s to 1790s) that acted as a catalyst for James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton, and others to restore an energetic executive.  The first period will 
focus on the transition form British to American constitutionalism that reached its 
consummation when the American colonies determined there was no other recourse but 
to separate from Great Britain.  The second period will focus on the state and national 
experiments with a weak executive and demonstrate how this exceptional period was a 
result of Americans getting sucked into the rhetorical choice of leaders of the American 
Revolution.  The third period will focus on the state and national events that led 
Americans to adopt an energetic executive within the US Constitution as well as the 
earliest application of the energetic executive with Washington’s Neutrality 
Proclamation of 1793. 
 
Summary 
The question of the executive’s authority over foreign affairs has been debated 
constantly over the life of the Constitution.  Rather than try to discern the answer to this 
question from only the well-known Framers, this scholarly endeavor proposes to unlock 
the original understanding of the Constitution to the “citizens, polemicists, and 
convention delegates who participated in one way or another in ratification” (8).  In 
opposition to the dominant paradigm of American foreign affairs law, this research 
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grounds itself in the power and authority of the Constitution’s history to determine 
whether the foreign affairs power is primarily, but not exclusively, an executive power.  
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CHAPTER II  
BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM TO AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
Understanding the continuity of American constitutionalism—from a British colony to 
13 separate nation-states to a national union of 13 states—is vital to discovering the 
historical answer to determine whether the President has primary authority over foreign 
affairs.  The purpose of the first chapter is to address the reasons for the constitutional 
conflict that spawned the American Revolution and how these relate to the early 
American perceptions of the executive. 
 
The American colonies and the British metropolis were continually debating the limits 
of constitutional authority—the balance of power—between each other.  Did the 
American colonies have exclusive right to govern their internal affairs or did the British 
metropolis?  Better yet, did the center of the British Empire share an equitable balance of 
power with its peripheries (i.e., colonies) by only governing external affairs while 
leaving the internal matters to the peripheries?  This constitutional debate continued 
from the American colonial period in the early 1600s throughout the 1700s until the 
British accepted defeat at the Treaty of Paris in 1783 by which the American colonies 
were formally granted independence from the British constitutional center.  Even then, 
the Americans struggled to find a balance between the national and state governments 
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that did not reach consummation until after the US Constitution was adopted by 9 states 
in 1788.  
 
From the inception of the American colonies, their constitutional relationship with 
Britain was unlike any of the colonies from the medieval empire (e.g., Ireland, Wales, 
and Gascony).  Jack Greene describes three major differences that characterized the 
American colonies in comparison with their older cousins.  First, Greene (1986) notes 
the “three thousand miles” distance from the center of the British Empire (8).  Second, 
the American colonies had a “population density [that] was low relative to the most fully 
occupied areas of Europe” and contained much land ready for colonization (and 
commercialization) (8).  Unlike other British colonies, the American colonies were 
comprised of English emigrants (some voluntary, some compulsory) who inherited many 
English beliefs and customs rather than conquered indigenous people. The British 
perception of the indigenous Americans as primitive and pagan rendered the indigenous 
Americans of little threat to British colonization.  Instead, the British forced out or 
bought out indigenous populations and replaced them with “emigrants from the British 
Isles” (8).  Third, Greene points out that these new American colonies lacked the “long-
settled local traditions, institutions, and patterns of social relations” that dictated the 
constitutional organization of previous British colonies (8).  The American colonies’ 
primary purpose was to strengthen the commerce of the British Empire, and this purpose 
marked a new colonial identity that frustrated British expectations of colonial 
subservience and American expectations of internal autonomy: “Thus ‘intended to 
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increase the Wealth and Power of the[ir] native Kingdom,’ these ‘Colonies of 
Commerce,’ people gradually come to perceive, were an entirely ‘new species of 
colonizing, of modern date, and differing essentially from every other species of 
colonizing that is known’ ” (9-10).   
 
English colonization of the American colonies (as well as elsewhere) could not have 
occurred without a constitutional exchange between the center and the peripheries: the 
center would have to concede a degree of local autonomy to the peripheries in exchange 
for allegiance and commercial obligations from the peripheries.   
Lacking the fiscal resources to enable them to undertake such territorial 
expansion on their own, English monarchs had no other means by which 
to establish the legitimacy of their claims to both new territories and…the 
allegiance of the inhabitants of those territories…without a series of 
reciprocal agreements, or…contracts that permitted the sponsors and the 
individual colonists a generous amount of political freedom and wide 
latitude to pursue their own personal objectives in return for extending the 
dominions of the sponsors and the monarchy over vast new areas in 
America.  (11-12) 
 
Although the metropolitan center never conceded its superior claims over “ ‘such 
inferior dominion[s],’ ” American colonists “ ‘grew up…in a spirit of independence and 
self-reliance’ ” that refused to concede all authority to an absolute central power (12).  
The metropolitan authorities of the Crown and Parliament sought to secure the 
constitutional inferiority of the American colonies between 1651 and 1696 through “a 
series of navigation acts designed to define the economic relationship between England 
and the colonies” (13).  These acts sought to realign the economic priorities of the 
colonies toward the center by banning trade with “rival foreign powers” and mandating 
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economic activity in an effort to create a mercantilist system fueled the metropolitan 
center at the expense of the colonies’ locally autonomous governments (13).  The 
Crown’s creation of the Lords of Trade in 1675 (later re-established as the Board of 
Trade in 1696) revealed the inertia that had gathered at the center to reign in the power 
of its peripheries.   
 
The metropolitan authority’s centralization agenda was evident by the apparent 
objectives of the Lords of Trade’s actions.  First, the Lords of Trade demanded greater 
enforcement of metropolitan demands from the royal governors: “Not only did it insist 
upon more frequent and fuller reports…within the colonies, but it also put the governors 
under much more detailed and rigid regulations than ever…” (14).  Second, the Lords of 
Trade sought to significantly reduce the powers of the local “elected legislative 
assemblies” of which the metropolitan authorities believed was the “primary vehicles for 
colonial resistance to metropolitan policy” (14).  The metropolitan center sought to 
eliminate the financial dependency that most governors had on their local assemblies 
since these assemblies controlled executive payrolls—each of the colonial assemblies 
believed that they paralleled Parliament’s scope of power.  Third, the Lords of Trade 
sought to make all American colonies royal colonies as well as “consolidate the colonies 
into three general governments,” but their efforts to create the these three consolidated 
governments (e.g. Dominion of New England) disintegrated after the Glorious 
Revolution (15).  Still seeing themselves as Englishmen, the colonists developed a deep 
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mistrust of centralized authority as they found themselves having to advocate for their 
claim to all of the rights of Englishmen in the face of the metropolitan subordination.    
 
American colonists successfully frustrated most of the metropolitan’s efforts to 
constitutionally subordinate the colonies between 1660 and 1760, but the metropolitan 
authorities of Crown and Parliament developed “working assumptions about the 
[constitutional] nature of the relationship between Britain and the colonies—between the 
center and the peripheries of the British Empire” (18).  First, the metropolis believed that 
the colonies were “dependent entities, an idea that was at the heart of the familiar parent-
child metaphor that was increasingly employed to describe the metropolitan-colonial 
connection” (18).  Second, the metropolis believed that the colonies’ existence was 
primarily for their commercial “contributions to the well-being” of England.  Third, the 
metropolis demanded absolute subordination of the “political systems of the colonies…” 
(18).   As Greene points out, the primary obstacle between the American colonies and 
the British center was defining and applying “such concepts as dependence and 
subordination” in a constitutional balance that honored the demands of both parties (18).  
American colonists did not yet question their allegiance to the British center, but they 
did question the British center’s efforts to consolidate power in the Crown and 
Parliament at the expense of colonial rights.   
 
The constitutional debate between the British center and American peripheries was 
heightened because of the different bases of power that supported the government from 
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which the two sides represented.  Despite many shared customs and traditions, these 
competing forms of government, mixed and republican, created an inherent 
constitutional incompatibility that would result in war.  The American colonial 
legislatures were far more representative of the general populace than British Parliament 
since more American colonists were able to meet the suffrage requirements than their 
British cousins and there was no large, landed aristocracy.  Consequently, the British 
mixed from of government (royalty, aristocracy, free landowners) gave way in the 
American colonies to republican government where the power rested in the people at 
large rather than in social classes: “ ‘Instead of drawing nearer to the mixt Forms’ of the 
British constitution…the colonial governments were becoming more and more like ‘pure 
Republic[s]’ ” (33).  This republican premise of government would find its way into the 
heart of the American Revolutionary War and the US Constitution alongside British 
constitutional institutions.   
 
From 1679 until 1783, metropolitan authorities of the Crown and Parliament found the 
basis for their constitutional argument in a concept articulated in Poyning’s Law—
Poyning introduced the law to the Irish Parliament in 1494 as Viceroy to the English 
Crown.  As interpreted by metropolitan officials in the 17th and 18th Centuries, Poyning’s 
Law articulated the belief that colonial charters were limited to the original charters 
granted by the Crown: “the colonists could not ‘pretend to greater privileges than those 
[specifically] granted to them by Charter Act under the Great Seal’ ” (33-34).  As the 
Lords of Trade stated in 1679, the precepts of this law rendered the Crown under no 
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obligation to honor constitutions established by the colonies beyond the original charter.  
Furthermore, the metropolitan authorities believed that the metropolis had no legislative 
power “without the grace of the crown” and that since all governing power was derived 
from the Crown, not the people, no rights of colonists or powers of colonial assemblies 
could supersede the mandates of the Crown (34).  In essence, the Crown could demand 
anything not explicitly granted to the colonies in their original charter, even the 
abridgement of what the colonists believed as rights inherit to every Englishman. 
 
American colonists responded to metropolitan declarations of absolute superiority like 
Poyning’s Law by asserting their pre-existing rights as Englishmen, which superseded 
any Crown granted charter.  Citing Sir Edmund Coke, they claimed, “the charters, like 
the Magna Charta itself, were only ‘declaratory of Old Rights, and not…Grant[s] of new 
ones’ ” (36).  Additionally, the American colonists based their constitutional arguments 
on the basis of custom, which played such a fundamental role in the development of 
British law and constitutionalism.  Despite the rise of parliamentary supremacy—the 
notion that parliamentary legislation constitutionally superseded custom—, custom bore 
the force of law in the British Empire, especially in the American colonies where there 
was no longstanding legal or constitutional tradition.  But, according to Thomas 
Rutherford, changes in custom as well as legislative proscription demand that “the 
governors and the people have mutually agreed to change the constitution” (39). 
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American constitutionalism began to emerge as a separate identity from British 
constitutionalism.  American constitutionalism was built upon the premises of pre-
existing rights as Englishmen, custom, and the need for consent from the peripheries to 
check centralization.  The two forms of constitutionalism remain continuous since 
American constitutionalism grew out of British constitutionalism, but American 
constitutionalism had to assert its independence and sovereignty to fulfill its claims of 
legitimacy since the primary British constitutional arbiter (Parliament) refused to grant 
any constitutional grounds for argument to the American colonies.  Along side the 
republican model of government, these early American constitutional premises served as 
the framework for which the American Revolution was fought and won. 
 
According to Jack Greene, the metropolitan authorities “during the seven decades 
following the Glorious Revolution…never made a sustained effort to govern the colonies 
in ways that were at serious variance with colonial opinion” because of the “strategic 
[economic] importance” that the American colonies played.  The American colonies’ 
economic growth relative to rival European powers led Parliamentary managers such as 
Sir Robert Walpole (arguable Britain’s first Prime Minister, 1721-1742) to “restrict the 
active role of government as much as possible and act only when it was expedient or 
necessary to do so…” (45).  Sir Walpole managed domestic support most effectively by 
resolving conflict with “compromise and manipulation,” and Sir Walpole found a greater 
benefit in reaping the economic successes of the American colonies than in disrupting 
the metropolitan-colonial relations for the sake of centralization (46).  In fact, British 
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constitutionalism after the Glorious Revolution (1689) experienced a great deal of 
decentralization: “During the eighty years following the Glorious Revolution, Britain 
seems to have experienced a significant redistribution of power to the localities…The 
same development was evident in Britain’s more distant peripheries in Ireland and 
America…” (63).  
 
As a result of decentralization, American colonial assemblies developed a 
constitutionalism that mirrored the changes experienced by British Parliament such as 
creating a Bill of Rights and the right to representative government.  Charles Gadsden, a 
South Carolina merchant, said, “though they [British Parliament and colonial 
assemblies] differ widely with regard to the extent of their different spheres of action, 
and the latter’s may be called a sphere within the former’s, yet they differ not an iota” 
(64).  The America colonial assemblies established over 6 decades worth of tradition and 
usage that had become constitutional practice in the eyes of the colonists—including the 
protection of individual rights.  On the other hand, Metropolitan authorities did not agree 
to this exact parallelism between British Parliament and American colonial assemblies.  
Parliament and the rest of the metropolitan apparatus believed that colonies were, as 
Lord Granville put it to Benjamin Franklin 1757 while serving as President of the Privy 
Council, subject to the dominion of the Crown and his ministers (of the Privy Council): 
“The King and [Privy] Council is THE LEGISLATOR of the Colonies; and when his 
Majesty’s instructions come there, they are the LAW OF THE LAND…” (52).   
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Colonial leaders responded to these declarations by the Crown “with Jealousy and 
Distrust upon the Royal Authority” (53).  The centralist and absolutist declarations of the 
Crown alarmed colonists and cemented their belief in the need for representative 
assembly “that tend[ed] to balance…or keep…down” the Crown’s abuse of power (53).  
The rhetoric of the American colonists against the abuses of the executive began to 
emerge even while Parliament loomed in the background providing the necessary 
constitutional legitimacy for the Crown to pursue subordination of the colonies.  
Although most American colonial angst was directed at the Crown, Parliament had 
absorbed a great deal of sovereignty from the Crown as well as shared constitutionally 
liability for the actions against the American colonies. 
   
Early American perception of the Crown and Parliament 
American perceptions of the British executive, the Crown, and the British legislature, 
Parliament (generally the House of Commons), throughout the 17th and 18th Centuries 
evolved as Parliament began to take a more visible role towards the 1760s.  Although the 
general metropolitan consensus was that Parliament and the Crown had the authority to 
legislate in the Americans colonies without consent of the colonies, the Crown played a 
more visible role until the mid-18th Century since royal governors and their agents were 
the primary enforcement officers of royal and parliamentary decrees.  As the Declaration 
of Independence states, some colonial governors under direction of the Crown (not to 
mention the Crown acting directly) had refused to grant assent to colonial legislation as 
well as prorogue some colonial assemblies.  But many if not most of the American 
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colonial governors developed a close association with local colonial interests: 
Ever since the 1670s, however, metropolitan officials had been slowly 
taking into their own hands the patronage to most key offices in the 
colonies with the result that most [colonial] governors…had few 
utilitarian resources through which they might have enhanced 
metropolitan authority in the colonies…Under these conditions, many 
governors…frequently aligned themselves with dominant political 
factions in the colonies…As a consequence, royal and proprietary 
governors in many colonies were fully integrated into the local political 
community and came to be identify and to be identified as much with the 
interests of the colonies as with those of the metropolis.  (47)  
 
The role of governors in the American colonies proved far less tyrannical as American 
rhetoric against the Crown suggests.  After the metropolitan authorities sought to redirect 
appointment powers to London instead of the respective colonial governors, the colonial 
governors had meager means to enforce the metropolitan authority’s bidding and still 
depended upon the local assemblies for funding.  As a result, the colonial governors 
became integrated into the American colonial political atmosphere in a manner that did 
not reflect poorly on their executive capacity.  Although the “crown, through its 
governors and its powers of legislative and judicial review, exerted the predominant role 
in metropolitan interactions with the colonies,” the aggrandizement of British 
constitutional authority by Parliament since the Glorious Revolution at the expense of 
the Crown made Parliament a concurrent actor in metropolitan administration of the 
American colonies (66).  The Crown’s appeals to Parliament, as well as some colonies’, 
revealed the Crown’s inability to regulate the internal matters of the colonies and the 
need for Parliament to take a larger role in metropolitan-colonial relations around the 
1760s.   
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During the first half of the 18th Century, metropolitan authorities and colonial assemblies 
sought out Parliament as a constitutional arbiter for metropolitan-colonial relations.   
Until the 1760s, Parliament did not respond definitively in favor of either the Crown or 
the colonists.  This constitutional limbo resulted in the Crown conceding power to 
Parliament and pushed the American colonists towards creating their own constitutional 
path that would be incompatible with Parliament.  “[T]he assemblies themselves 
occasionally appealed to Parliament against what they regarded as arbitrary behavior of 
the crown” (59).  “[M]etropolitan administrators counted on the assistance of Parliament 
to handle difficult colonial situations” (59-60).  The Crown’s appeals to Parliament to 
increase royal authority admitted the growing sovereignty of Parliament over matters of 
the Empire, specifically colonies, that had been originally been considered dominions of 
the Crown.  Parliament’s only major legislative activities regarding the colonies during 
the first half of the18th Century were limited to external matters such as trade.  As the 
18th Century progressed, most metropolitan authorities believed that Parliament was the 
final constitutional arbiter for the entire Empire: “In all British Cases and over all 
Persons according to the  British Constitution, the Legislature of Great-Britain [was] 
absolutely supreme and the Dernieir Resort ”(68).  Overall, colonists and Britons alike 
had begun to acknowledge—whether they agreed with it or not—the legitimacy of 
Parliament’s growing embodiment of the British Constitution: “the constitution became 
precisely what Parliament said it was” (58).   
 
Parliament began to step out from the shadows and into colonial affairs in the mid-1700s 
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as a competitor with the Crown for what the American colonists saw as arbitrary and 
tyrannical threats to their individual rights.  The first time that Parliament directly 
interfered with domestic colonial concerns was in Jamaica in 1733: “with the full 
approval of the Crown, it censured the Jamaica Assembly for making extravagant 
constitutional claims while resisting instructions from London” (69).  This censure of the 
Jamaica Assembly acknowledges the complicity of the Crown and Parliament in 
meddling with domestic colonial affairs, but further Parliamentary intervention would 
enrage American colonists even more than the Crown alone.  Parliament’s discussion of 
royal instruction laws in the colonies during the 1740s was recognized by most colonists 
as a direct threat to their individual rights as Englishmen: “Such legislation, the colonists 
contended, was ‘contrary to the Constitution[s] of Great Britain & of the Plantations’ 
and ‘inconsistent with the Liberties & Privileges inherent in an Englishman whilst he is 
in a British Dominion’ ” (Colden 1934, 310-312).  Echoes of no legislation without 
representation began to emerge from American colonists.  While metropolitan 
authorities believed that Parliamentary supremacy enabled Parliament to alter and 
abolish colonial constitutions, American colonists began to perceive Parliament as a 
threat to their individual liberties and representative government.  The lack of a “formal 
and theoretically neutral mechanism to which people in the peripheries could appeal 
against an erring Parliament” forced many colonists to retreat to an American 
constitutionalism that refused to acknowledge an absolute governing body that was not 
accountable to those it governed (Greene 1986, 72).   
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Parliamentary refusal to enforce royal instruction laws in the colonies during the 1740s 
gave many American colonists a false hope that Parliament could serve as neutral 
constitutional arbiter.  In 1757, Parliament condemned the Jamaica Assembly in 
language that William Knox claimed placed the colonial constitutions subservient to the 
whims of the metropolis: “the Colonys [sic] have no Constitution, but that mode of 
Government in each of them depends upon the good pleasure of the King, as expressed 
in his commission and Instructions to his Governor” (Barrow 1973).  According to 
Greene, “The colonists failure to give major weight to such evidence provides 
impressive testimony to their basic trust in Parliament, which…was founded on 
Parliament’s not having acted toward the colonies before the 1760s in ways that could be 
perceived as unusual, arbitrary, or threatening” (73-74).  The hopeful American colonial 
perception of Parliament as the last vestige of constitutional integrity was soon shattered 
after the events of the 1760s.   
 
After victory against the French and Indians in the Seven Years’ War, the British center 
found itself in desperate need of monies to support the cost of the war as well as to 
secure its defenses on newly acquired territories from winning the war: “faced with a 
large war debt and high taxes in Great Britain, the imperial government initiated a 
program of taxing the colonies for revenue with the Sugar Act of 1764” (Greene 1975, 
13).  The proposed taxation scheme presented in the Sugar Act, which would be fulfilled 
by the Stamp Act the following year, provoked colonial outcry because of the economic 
devastation it could have on colonial economies.  Constitutionally, the American 
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colonists questioned the legitimacy of Parliament’s ability to directly tax the colonies.  
In 1765, Parliament passed two pieces of legislation that encompassed direct and indirect 
taxation of the colonies: the Stamp Act and the Quartering Act.  Colonists bound 
together in the Stamp Act Congress and issued that famous statement that would be a 
constitutional battle cry: “That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and 
the undoubted rights of Englishmen, that no taxes should be imposed on them, but with 
their own consent, given personally, or by their representatives” (64).  No taxation 
without representation was a successful cry among the colonists because Parliament 
repealed the Stamp Act in 1766, but, in the same breath, Parliament issued the 
Declaratory Act.  The Declaratory Act claimed that Parliament acting in concert with the 
king had the “full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and 
validity to bind the colonies and peoples of America, subjects of the crown of Great 
Britain, in all cases whatsoever” (85).  This act set the stringent and absolutist tone that 
Parliament would follow through the rest of the American Revolution with the 
Townshend Acts (1767), the Tea Act (1774), and the Intolerable Acts (1774); this act 
revealed Parliament’s declaration of its own constitutional sovereignty over the colonies.  
After Parliament had explicitly declared its constitutional argument over the colonies in 
its laws, the American colonists had to solidify their constitutional argument. 
 
The constitutional relationship with Britain thins 
The Declaration of Independence embodies the American constitutional argument 
against the British center and for separation from that center.  The metropolitan’s 
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aggressive actions leading up to 1776 were in an effort to subordinate the American 
colonies, but these actions marked the first time that the Crown had the full force of 
Parliament behind it, which was vital given Parliament’s growing sovereignty.  
According to Carl Becker (1970), “the primary purpose of the Declaration was not to 
declare independence, but to proclaim to the world the reasons for declaring 
independence” (5).  The American colonial response to the growing metropolitan threat 
in the 1760s and early 1770s was to find the constitutional and legal grounding that 
would justify their actions.   
 
During the Townshend Act debate in the colonies, John Dickinson set forth a 
constitutional theory as to evaluate the legitimacy of Parliament’s claim to possess the 
authority to tax the colonies.  Dickinson recognizes that Parliament had historically 
exercised taxation to “regulate trade, and preserve or promote the mutually beneficial 
intercourse between the several constituent parts of the empire” (Dickinson 1768, 125).  
Dickson noted Parliament’s sudden shift in agenda after the Stamp Acts and the 
attempted proroguing of the New York assembly for refusing to implement the 
Quartering Act; he draws a constitutional demarcation for Parliament’s taxation of the 
colonies on the grounds of revenue versus trade regulation.  He claimed that 
Parliamentary taxation for trade regulation was constitutional while taxation for explicit 
revenue purposes was unconstitutional because it violated the Englishman’s age-old 
right to representation to the legislative bodies that tax him.   
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Benjamin Franklin in 1768 suggested to his fellow Americans that such a constitutional 
demarcation between taxes for revenue and taxes for trade regulation could not hold up 
to constitutional muster.  Franklin reasoned that there could be “no middle ground…that 
Parliament had the power to make all laws for us, or that it has the power to make no 
laws for us…” (Becker 102).  If the Americans acknowledged Parliament had any 
authority over the American colonies—even in the matter of external commerce, which 
they had regulated without much controversy for almost a century—, Franklin believed 
that Americans could not constitutionally partition Parliament’s authority over the 
colonies: all or nothing.  Franklin’s argument marked a shift in American constitutional 
rhetoric. 
 
The American colonists largely adopted Franklin’s constitutional argument, and, by 
1770, Franklin advised that the following working assumption should be adopted: “That 
the colonies originally were constituted distinct States…and the whole conduct of the 
Crown and nation towards them until the Restoration.  Since that period, the Parliament 
here has usurped an authority of making laws for them, which before it had not” (103).  
The American constitutional argument from 1770 on suggested that the Crown was the 
only British metropolitan authority to which the American colonies were beholden.  
Parliament’s authority over the American colonies became a dead letter to the American 
colonists.  Until this time, American constitutionalism did not deny Parliament’s 
authority over external matters of the British Empire as a whole; but as revolution and 
independence from Great Britain became an increasingly unavoidable option, so did the 
24 
redaction of any parliamentary authority over the American colonies. 
 
In the late 1760s and early 1770s, James Wilson began to compose a theory of relations 
that would solidify Franklin’s view as well as set the foundations for the Declaration of 
Independence.  Wilson (1804) claimed that the American colonies owed their 
“obedience and loyalty…to the kings of Great Britain…this union of allegiance produces 
a union of hearts” (3: 99).  Furthermore, Wilson describes Parliament’s relation to the 
colonies: “The connexion [sic] and harmony between Great Britain and us…will be 
better preserved by the operation of the legal prerogatives of the crown, than by the 
exertion of an unlimited authority by Parliament” (3: 99).  Contrary to the anti-crown 
rhetoric laid out in the Declaration of Independence, Wilson believed that the Crown 
was the only valid constitutional means of connecting dominions within the Empire.  
Advocating a confederation view of the British Empire, Wilson acknowledged the 
constitutional compatibility of the center and peripheries as long as the peripheries 
maintained their own rights to self-government and representation, especially over 
domestic affairs. 
 
Wilson’s theory of metropolitan-colonial relations makes explicitly clear the nature of 
the Crown’s foreign affairs prerogative as it relates to the British Empire.  Wilson states, 
“the king is intrusted [sic] with the direction and management of the great machine of 
government…He makes war: he concludes peace: he forms alliances; he regulates 
domestic trade by his prerogative, and directs foreign commerce by his treaties with 
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those nations, with whom it is carried on…[rather] than by the exertion of an unlimited 
authority by Parliament” (3: 99). Wilson affirms the king’s appropriate constitutional 
place as a manager and director of foreign affairs.  Wilson also acknowledges that the 
constitutional balance of the foreign affairs of his day does not recognize parliamentary 
supremacy in foreign affairs, but rather the Crown has the primary authority over leading 
foreign affairs.  
 
As American constitutionalism separates itself form British constitutionalism, American 
constitutional arguments make clear that the republican character of American 
constitutionalism absorbs elements of the British Constitution, such as the executive’s 
prerogative (though not exclusive right) over foreign affairs.   
 
The American constitutional argument prior to the Declaration of Independence had 
morphed from recognition of at least some bound of Parliamentary authority over the 
colonies to none at all.  In Thomas Jefferson’s 1774 warning to the king entitled “A 
Summary View of the Rights of British-America” (1774), he rhetorically declares the 
American disbelief of any American colonial subservience to Parliament by declaring 
the egregious acts of Parliament as attempts to wholly (constitutional and otherwise) 
subjugate the colonies:  
That thus we have hastened through the reigns which preceded his 
majesty’s, during which the violations of our right were less alarming, 
because repeated at more distant intervals than that rapid and bold 
succession of injuries which is likely to distinguish the present from all 
other periods of the American story.  Scarcely have our minds been able 
to emerge form the astonishment into which one stroke of parliamentary 
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thunder has involved us, before another more heavy, and more alarming, 
is fallen on us.  Single acts of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental 
opinion of a day; but a series of oppressions have begun at a distinguished 
period, and pursued, unalterably through every change of ministers, too 
plainly prove a deliberate and systematical plan of reducing us to slavery.  
(Jefferson 231) 
 
Jefferson’s appeal to King George III affirms the active role that Parliament had 
assumed in the metropolitan-colonial relations during the almost two decades leading up 
to the American Revolution.  Not only does Jefferson acknowledge Parliament’s 
centralizing agenda for American colonial affairs, he also notes the surprise of the 
American colonial public when they realized Parliament’s deciding role in precipitating 
constitutional conflict between the British center and the American peripheries.  The 
extremely abusive role of the legislative admitted by Jefferson and the American public 
appears to run counter to the analysis offered by Jefferson (and the American people) in 
the Declaration of Independence. 
 
The Declaration of Independence declares the grounds for its separation by the natural 
rights of every American against the tyranny of a wicked British King: “The History of 
the present King of Great-Britain is a History of repeated Injuries and Usurpations, all 
having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.  To 
prove his, let Facts be submitted to a candid World” (Constitution/Declaration 1991, 36).  
Twenty-seven indictments against King George III later, the Declaration makes clear to 
all that the colonists renounce all responsibility for the separation and place the blame 
firmly on the king.   
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American independence 
The American relationship with Parliament drastically changed during the 1760s and 
70s.  American colonists discovered that legislatures could act just as tyrannically as one 
man.  Parliament overstepped its bound by trying to dictate the internal affairs of the 
colonies.  The American colonists dropped any mention from Parliament by the time the 
Declaration was written because the American constitutional argument for separation 
from Britain would have been inconsistent and weakened by trying to maintain any 
constitutional relationship to Parliament.  Thus, the main defendant of the Declaration’s 
indictments was King George III since he was the last (or only, depending on how you 
read the evolution of American constitutional arguments) constitutional tie to the 
American colonies; and, as a result, King George III was held responsible by American 
rhetoric for the violation of American colonists’ natural rights.  No king or parliament 
could ever violate American neither colonists’ liberties nor their right to government by 
consent.  In reality, the Crown and Parliament were concurrent actors with concurrent 
liabilities in the violation of American colonists’ natural rights.  Anti-executive 
sentiment during and after the American Revolution ignored the reality that a legislature 
could be just as bad or worse than a unitary executive.  The American sentiment against 
a unitary executive during this time period must be cautiously examined in the light of 
this chapter’s findings. 
 
First, the emergence of American constitutionalism out of British constitutionalism was 
continuous.  In Jack Greene’s Peripheries and Center (1986), he argues in favor of a 
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historical perspective of American constitutionalism that “stresses the continuity of 
constitutional issues from the colonial period through the Revolution” (x).  The 
development of American constitutionalism was heavily rooted in the British 
constitutional and legal traditions, and key geographical and demographic factors (i.e., 
distance from the British center, low population density with small indigenous 
population, and no longstanding societal traditions) enabled American colonists to apply 
British constitutional precepts in a new context that proved more republican in nature 
because of the power derived from the people rather than the social estates.  The political 
traditions that emerged in the American colonies mimicked British political precepts and 
structures.  When American colonial governments separated from the British center, 
these governments retained much of the British system of old: representative assemblies 
that mirrored Parliament in scope and purpose, governors retaining responsibilities as 
under British dominion, and civil society grew up with many “British” expectations for 
government operations.  State constitutions post-Revolutionary War were merely 
enhanced versions of their British predecessors with more republican impulses. 
 
More importantly, the American victory over the British did not solve the fundamental 
constitutional problem of balancing power between a political center or union of states 
and the respective peripheries or individual states.  American constitutionalism grew to 
believe by 1776 that the British solution to this constitutional dilemma was terribly 
wrong—that is why the Americans fought for their independence.  After the adoption of 
the US Constitution, the Americans were unified as the United States of America.  The 
29 
adoption of the US Constitution solidified American constitutionalism in a document in 
order to avoid the bad experience of an amorphous British Constitution embodied in 
Parliament, but the constitutional debate on the balance between the center and the 
peripheries continued throughout the American Civil War—some would even say it 
continues today.  This constitutional continuity began first with the British, and many of 
their traditions influenced American institutions.  The executive is no exception.  The 
republican nature of the United States would not and could not tolerate a king, but the 
US Constitution did adopt a unitary executive whose foreign affairs powers, in relation 
to the legislative and judicial branches, closely resemble the same prerogative exercised 
by the British King and some state governors between 1776 and 1788. 
 
Second, the American colonial perception of the executive was skewed by the rhetoric 
espoused in the Declaration of Independence.  Out of rhetorical and constitutional 
necessity, the American colonists had to sever their constitutional ties to Parliament 
despite attempts throughout the first half of the 18th Century to appeal to Parliament as a 
constitutional arbiter.  Once the American colonists realized that Parliament as the 
constitutional arbiter of the British  Empire and British Constitution would not enable 
the colonies to enjoy the fundamental rights that they believed inalienable from their 
existence, the American colonists—justifiably since Parliament and the Crown 
effectively argued after the 1760s that they had the authority to abridge the constitutions 
and charters of the American colonists, even in violation of natural laws acknowledged 
by the likes of Blackstone—severed their ties to Parliament in their constitutional 
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arguments and rhetoric.  Consequently, the Crown was all that was left to blame for the 
tyrannical encroachments committed by the British center.  The Declaration of 
Independence does not mention Parliament directly, but an indirect reference to 
Parliament is made: “He has combined with other to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign 
to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws; giving his Assent to their pretend 
acts of Legislation…” (Declaration of Independence 1991, 37).  The American 
perception of the Crown became far worse after the Declaration and the subsequent war.   
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (1776), which became a sacred text to the 
revolutionary generation, embodies the American perspective of the Crown: 
The nearer any government approaches to a republic the less business 
there is for a king.  It is somewhat difficult to find a proper name for the 
government of England.  Sir William Meredith calls it a republic; but in 
its present state it is unworthy of the name, because the corrupt influence 
of the crown, by having all the places in its disposal, hath so effectually 
swallowed up the power, and eaten out the virtue of the house of 
commons [the republican part of the constitution]… (Paine 275) 
 
Paine’s words lead the reader to believe that the Crown is the primary conspirator 
in the subjugation of the American colonies.  The rhetoric Paine employs seems 
to relieve Parliament of any complicity in the actions against the American 
colonies.  Despite Parliament’s growing role as the British constitutional 
arbiter—which does not mean sovereign over all British affairs (i.e., foreign 
affairs since colonies were not foreign entities but member states of the 
Empire)—in the decades leading up to the American Revolution, Paine places 
the blame for the meltdown of metropolitan-colonial relations on the British 
king.  More tellingly, Paine evokes the American constitutional foundation of 
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republicanism and attributes it to Parliament.  Although Parliament was a 
constitutional institution that was more representative and therefore more 
republican than the Crown, Parliament’s growing disregard for representative 
government in the American colonies on whatever grounds was far from 
republican.  Obviating the history of Parliament and the American colonies over 
the past century, Paine demonstrates the anti-executive rhetoric that began to be 
popular among Revolutionary Americans.  Although many state governors prior 
to the US Constitution and eventually the US President were instituted as 
republican executives directly accountable to the people from which they derived 
their Constitutional authority, the resentment of a unitary executive, acting in any 
capacity, became typical rhetoric between 1776 and the first half of the 1780s. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXECUTIVE INTERREGNUM 
 
This chapter will evaluate the treatment of the executive in the original state 
constitutions, specifically containing to foreign affairs, and compare these treatments 
with the anti-executive rhetoric expressed in the previous chapter.   Also, the state 
legislative abuses preceding the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 will provide additional 
context for the development of anti-executive rhetoric.  The continuous development of 
American constitutionalism from 13 independent states to the Articles of Confederation 
to the US Constitution will provide a historic backdrop that offers context for the foreign 
affairs power of the executive as understood during the drafting and ratification of the 
US Constitution.  The continuity of American constitutionalism and the changing 
perceptions toward the executive in light of legislative abuses will reveal the 
abnormality of the argument that the US Constitution was drafted and ratified with the 
intention of subduing the executive more than other branches of government. 
 
Once the American Revolution had begun, each colony effectively declared itself an 
independent and sovereign state.  The loose confederation of the 13 former British 
colonies in America fought and formally won independence from Britain in 1783.  In 
response to separation from British rule, the states began experimenting with their own 
constitutions.  The republican spirit of the revolution was breathed into American 
constitutionalism as manifested in the states and built itself on the precept that the 
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government’s power was derived solely from the people; therefore, the government of 
each state was constitutionally fashioned to fulfill the representative character that 
republicanism demanded.  Until the US Constitution was adopted in 1788 by the formal 
consent of nine American states, American constitutionalism was not unified or 
consistent within each state; but the constitutional experiments that the original 13 
American states conducted by fashioning their revolutionary era state constitutions 
provided a great deal of context for the drafting and ratification of the US Constitution. 
 
Impact of American anti-executive rhetoric 
John Yoo outlines the American revolutionary response toward the executive: “The new 
state constitutions sought to tame the executive by placing explicit restrictions on its 
power and by diluting its structural unity and independence [from other branches]” (62).  
In line with the thinking of Thomas Paine, many state constitutions between 1776-1787 
sought to weaken the executive’s overall scope of powers.  Yoo claims that the state 
constitutions remain central to the process of defining the executive’s foreign affairs 
power because they provide a host of problems that the Framers of the US Constitution 
sought to remedy since the “mechanisms chosen by the revolutionaries to control the 
executive contrast sharply with the Constitution of 1787” (62).  Most state constitutions 
between 1776 and 1787 removed the independence of the executive by selecting the 
executive (i.e., governor) from the legislature and compromised the unity of the 
executive by fostering plural executive institutions largely dependent on the legislature.  
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The anti-executive rhetoric of the American Revolution fostered a period of Executive 
Interregnum whereby the executive was weakened at the hands of the legislature. 
 
Every state but New York invested the legislature with the power to select the governor 
and severely limited the term and eligibility of the governor.  The result of placing the 
executive under direct appointment of the legislature contradicted the basic republican 
premise of direct responsibility and accountability to the people.  Maryland’s 
constitution of 1776 stated the anti-executive rhetoric quite plainly: “a long continuance, 
in the first executive departments of power or trust, is dangerous to liberty; a rotation, 
therefore, in these departments, is one of the best securities of permanent freedom” 
(Thorpe (1909) 3: 1689).  The Pennsylvania constitution, which was probably the most 
anti-executive state constitution between 1776 and 1787, compromised the unitary 
character of the executive by creating a plural executive—a twelve men executive 
council (5: 3086-87).  Many other states required that the governor deliberate every 
major decision with a special committee of the legislature before action could be taken. 
 
Thomas Jefferson’s draft for the Virginia constitution of 1776 simply labeled the 
executive as the “Administrator” (Boyd (1950) 337, 341).  Yoo extrapolates Jefferson’s 
proposal of the executive, which was rejected and replaced with George Mason’s 
proposal, and accurately states that Jefferson’s proposal sought to castrate the executive 
to the utmost degree, especially in foreign affairs: “Jefferson enumerated powers that the 
executive could not exercise…When it came to war powers, Jefferson’s draft stated that 
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the administrator could not ‘declare war or peace, issue letters of marque or reprisal, 
raise or introduce armed forces, or build armed vessels…forts or strongholds’ ” (64).  
Contrary to Jefferson’s plan to strip the executive of all foreign affairs powers, Virginia 
adopted George Mason’s plan.  The Virginia constitution of 1776 did not completely 
strip the governor of his traditional (as inherited from British constitutionalism) authority 
over the primary direction of foreign affairs; instead, this constitution allowed that “the 
governor may embody the militia, with the advice of the Privy Council; and when 
embodied, shall alone have the direction of the militia, under the laws of the country” 
(Thorpe 7: 3815-3819).  The Virginia governor was not entirely absorbed by the 
legislative branch since he retained traditional executive functions such as the sole 
general of state militia forces, but the Virginians did succeed in diluting the executive as 
it was understood under British Constitutionalism and the American colonial experience. 
 
Yoo notes Jefferson’s persistence in trying to subjugate the executive, especially in 
foreign affairs, to the legislature were unsuccessful in practice; but Jefferson did succeed 
in widely circulating his thoughts on the executive:  
The [Virginia constitutional] convention also deleted Jefferson’s 
enumeration of war powers forbidden to the executive.  Undeterred, 
Jefferson offered his language as a constitutional amendment, but the 
members of the convention rejected it in favor of a provision permitting 
the governor, with the advice of a council of state, to ‘exercise the 
Executive powers of Government…’  Although a dead end, Jefferson’s 
scheme was widely circulated, and it provided an example of how the 
Framers could have created a legislature-first approach to war—had they 
chosen to do so.”  (64) 
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Despite the widespread public knowledge of Jefferson’s plan for a legislature superior to 
the executive, most states only placed “structural checks on the governor’s power, it was 
not a substantive limitation on the executive branch’s power” (64).  Although state 
constitutions during the Executive interregnum experimented with narrowing the scope 
of executive prerogatives, as compared to British constitutionalism, the constitutional 
boundaries that narrowed executive power did not completely diminish or remove the 
executive’s foreign affairs power (i.e., war and treaty making); and the US Constitution 
would not copy most of these structural limitations on executive power, especially over 
foreign affairs.  
 
The anti-executive rhetoric that dominated the Executive Interregnum was not so 
pervasive that it seeped into the creation of the US Constitution.  Willi Paul Adams’ 
(1980) study of revolutionary state constitutions confirms the finite nature of the 
Executive Interregnum:  
The striking fact of historical dimension is that the reaction against the 
colonial governor was so weak that it did not lead to [modern] 
parliamentary government with an executive committee of members of 
the legislature, but rather that within a decade the American system of 
presidential government evolved with full clarity and permanence. (271) 
 
The history of colonial governors as provided in the first chapter reveals that there were 
fewer colonial governors that completely agreed with the British metropolitan authorities 
and brutally enforced metropolis policy—among those that did actively support the 
metropolis, their efforts would have been in vain without the support and energy of 
Parliament.  The new American state constitutions of the revolutionary era did not 
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entirely embrace a legislative supremacy over all affairs since British Parliament had not 
even gained full supremacy by the time of the American Revolution (rather a king-in-
Parliament system).  The state constitutions of the Executive Interregnum subtly 
mimicked British constitutionalism, especially in the arena of foreign affairs. 
Most telling is the fact that state constitutions during this era did not entirely subjugate 
the executive to the legislature nor did the US Constitution adopt such an approach 
despite the revolutionary rhetoric seemingly in favor of such subjugation.  
 
John Adams’s “Thoughts on Government,” published in 1776, was widely read and 
implemented during the Executive Interregnum, especially concerning the executive.  
Adams’ fear of a supreme legislature to handle executive and legislative duties is clearly 
stated: “A representative assembly, although extremely well qualified, and absolutely 
necessary, as a branch of the legislative, is unfit to exercise the executive power, for 
want of two essential properties, secrecy and dispatch” (John Adams, Colonies to Nation 
308).  The Federalist Papers, published over a decade later, would repeat some of the 
same arguments during the ratification debates of the US Constitution.  These 
arguments, first articulated by Adams, claim that the legislative branch is not capable of 
fulfilling executive duties, especially duties of guiding the nation through war and peace, 
at the same efficiency as an executive independent from the legislature.  Responding to 
actions of war and resolving violent conflict demands a speediness for safety’s sake that 
a legislature with such a diverse and numerous body would rarely if ever achieve at the 
same pace as an independent executive.   
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Adams (1776) acknowledges the gross, unresponsive dangers of a monarchial executive 
like the British Crown, but he admits that the republican nature of an American 
executive must maintain a significant degree of independence and unity in order to best 
fulfill executive duties in the interest of the state: “let them…choose a governor, who, 
after being stripped of most of those badges of domination, called prerogatives, should 
have a free and independent exercise of his judgment, and be made also an integral part 
of the legislature” (309).  The governor, Adams claims, should work in accord with the 
legislature but in such a way that enables the governor to act as an independent and 
unitary body capable of fulfilling his duties.  Furthermore, Adams admits that his belief 
in a “free and independent” executive may be against the mainstream anti-executive 
movement of the Executive Interregnum (309).  Adams offers the alternative of a 
council to advise the executive, but he maintains that the executive must maintain certain 
powers inherent to the executive for the benefit of the state.  Of these specific powers, 
Adams argues that the executive must maintain “the command of the militia and of all 
your armies” (309).   
 
Adams’ unmistakable reference to an integral foreign affairs power would ruffle the 
feather of modern scholars like Harlod Koh who argue that the executive is at best equal 
to the legislature in matters of foreign affairs.  John Yoo interprets Adams’ statements 
about the executive as mirroring the British Constitution “after adjusting the branches of 
government to be more responsive to popular sovereignty” (65).  Yoo captures the 
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republican sentiment of Adams’ plan for government by reflecting on how Adams used 
popular sovereignty, a pillar of republicanism, to adapt (not completely disavow) British 
constitutional traditions, such as executive direction of foreign affairs.  Adams provides 
a vivid picture of an executive with primary, albeit non-exclusive, powers over particular 
foreign affairs at the height of anti-executive rhetoric. 
 
Anti-executive rhetoric during the American Revolution succeeded in instilling public 
fear in the executive, but this rhetoric was limited in its impact on the development of 
American constitutionalism.  John Yoo argues that American constitutionalism during 
the Executive Interregnum, despite anti-executive rhetoric, embodied a continuation of 
the British constitution: “if the states had wanted to reject the traditional model of 
Anglo-American war making, which was composed of executive initiative and 
legislative appropriations, their constitutions would have followed the lines suggested by 
Jefferson” (65).  Adopting more of an Adams’ approach, many state constitutions during 
the Executive interregnum refused to radically alter the “traditional allocation of powers 
between executive and legislative branches” and instead settled for the executive’s 
primary authority over foreign affairs (65). 
 
The state constitutions of New York, New Jersey, and Georgia show a continuation of 
the British tradition of the executive’s primary authority over foreign affairs.  All of 
these constitutions, in essence, declared that the executive (i.e., the governor) had 
“supreme executive power…[and] shall be captain-general and Commander in Chief 
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over all the militia, and other military and naval forces belonging to this State” (Thorpe 
2: 782).  New York’s strong executive from its 1777 constitution was held as a model for 
the US Constitution’s treatment of the executive since the New York governor was 
created as a strong independent and unitary executive, especially over foreign affairs 
such as direction of the military.  Interestingly enough, Yoo points out that the New 
York legislature had “no enumerated war authorities for the assembly, which left the 
legislature its customary role in making funding decisions” (Yoo 67).  
 
Keeping in line with the contemporary anti-executive sentiments of the Executive 
Interregnum, states such as Delaware, demanded checks on the executive’s war making 
powers: “[the] president, with the advice and consent of the privy council, may embody 
the militia, and act as captain-general and commander-in-chief…” (Thorpe 1: 564).  
Despite such state experiments with dilution of executive primacy over foreign affairs, 
John Yoo points out that the authors of the US Constitution could have selected such 
checks on the executive’s traditional authority over foreign affairs:  
These consultation provisions illustrate the common understanding 
among revolutionaries that the governor generally had no preexisting duty 
to consult with the legislature before sending the state into war.  
Correspondingly, if the Framers of the federal Constitution had wanted 
the president to consult either with the legislature or within the executive 
branch before embarking on a military venture, the could have easily 
borrowed from these state provisions and required the president to consult 
with the Senate (as some in the Constitutional Convention proposed) or 
some other body.  (66) 
 
The 13 separate American states’ experiments with constitution-making reveal 
continuity between American and British constitutionalism with structural changes that 
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reflected the republican spirit of revolutionary America even in spite of anti-executive 
rhetoric.    
 
After 1777, state constitutions of Massachusetts (adopted in 1780) and New Hampshire 
(adopted in 1784) established an executive with primary authority over war.  The 
Massachusetts’ constitution contained wording like New York concerning the 
governor’s sole authority to direct the operations of war, but the Massachusetts 
constitution also contained wording that affirmed the governor’s power to make war: 
The president of this state for the time being, shall be commander in chief 
of the army and navy, and all military forces of the state…and shall have 
full power by himself…to train, instruct, exercise and govern the militia 
and navy; and for the special defense and safety of this state to assemble 
in martial array, and put in warlike posture, the inhabitant thereof, and to 
lead and conduct them, and with them to encounter, expulse, resist and 
pursue by force of arms, as well by seas as by land, within and without 
the limits of this state; and also to kill, slay, destroy, if necessary, and 
conquer by all fitting ways, enterprise and means, all and every such 
person and persons as shall, at any time hereafter, in hostile manner, 
attempt or enterprise the destruction, invasion, detriment, or annoyance of 
this state; and to use and exercise over the army and navy, and over the 
militia in actual service, the law-martial in time of war, invasion, and also 
in rebellion, declared by the legislature to exist…and in fine, the president 
hereby is entrusted with all other powers incident to the office of captain-
general and commander in chief, and admiral…  (Thorpe 4: 2463-2464) 
 
The litany of war powers enumerated on behalf of the governor demonstrates the 
primacy of the executive in war.  John Yoo notes that the Massachusetts constitution of 
1780 did not simply limit the governor to actions of defense but also for “offensive 
operations under the executive, who may use any means he sees fit…to achieve his war 
aims” (69).  The Massachusetts model, fashioned as the anti-executive rhetoric was 
beginning to wane, offers a broad interpretation of executive war making powers.  
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Furthermore, the only legislative reference to war making aside from the traditional role 
of funding was to declare the domestic legal status of the state rather than granting 
executive permission to engage in war.  Yoo claims that such a declaratory role is only a 
“judicial announcement” that acknowledges the executive’s initiation of war (offensive 
or defensive) and establishes “the governor’s authority to declare martial law” (69).  
Contrary to contemporary beliefs about the meaning of “declaring war,” the founding 
generation of the US Constitution who had lived through the Revolutionary War 
understood a declaration as a legislative act necessary to temporarily alter the domestic 
status of the nation to enable martial law—enables the government to temporarily act in 
a greater role over domestic legal affairs than it normally might.   
 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire’s constitutional experiment with a strong, energetic 
executive would find its basic premises, such as executive primacy over war making 
(one of the most fundamental elements of foreign affairs), copied in the US Constitution.  
One of the most shocking evidences of the American constitutional tradition of 
executive primacy over foreign affairs was delivered in the “Essex Result.”  After 
Massachusetts held a constitutional convention in 1778 that included limiting the 
governor’s war making powers “according to the laws…or the resolves of the General 
Court,” the people of Essex, Massachusetts resoundingly rejected the proposal of 
compromising the independence and energy of the executive (Handlin and Handlin 
1966, 190).  The people of Essex delivered their own recommendation for the governor’s 
war powers: “Let the Governor alone marshal the militia, and regulate the same, together 
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with the navy…Should Providence or Portsmouth towns outside of, but near, 
Massachusetts be attacked suddenly, a day’s delay might be of most pernicious 
consequence.  Was the consent of the legislative body, or a branch of it, necessary, a 
longer delay would be unavoidable” (Parsons 1859, 396).  Despite anti-executive 
rhetoric, some of the American public saw the necessity for speed and efficiency during 
times of war—only an independent and unitary (as far as war powers are concerned) 
executive could fulfill this necessity. 
 
One of the most anti-executive state constitutions during the Executive Interregnum was 
South Carolina.  Its 1776 constitution declared “that the president and commander-in-
chief [i.e., the governor] shall have no power to make war or peace, or enter into any 
final treaty, without the consent of the general assembly and legislative council” (Thorpe 
6: 3247).  South Carolina’s 1778 constitution further refined its anti-executive nature by 
declaring “that the governor and commander-in-chief shall have no power to commence 
war, or conclude peace, or enter into any final treaty [without approval from the 
legislature]” (3255).  Yoo argues that the South Carolina constitutions of 1776 and 1778 
demonstrate two important means for deciphering the US Constitution’s definition of 
executive authority over foreign affairs powers: “First, it indicates that the common 
understanding of war powers did not require the executive to receive formal legislative 
approval to commence hostilities [hence the explicit language used regarding the 
proscription of the executive’s power]…Second, South Carolina’s war clause provides 
yet another example of a path not taken by the Philadelphia delegates” (72).  Despite 
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anti-executive rhetoric during the Executive Interregnum, Yoo magnificently points out 
that one of the greatest constitutional experiments with proscribing the executive’s 
foreign affairs power—South Carolina—was not chosen for the US Constitution and 
thereby failed to hold a strong constitutional footing.   
 
Failures of the Articles of Confederation 
The next American constitutional milestone was the final ratification of the Articles of 
Confederation in 1781.  The Articles of Confederation seemed to rightfully emerge from 
the American Revolutionary spirit of localized sovereignty.  In 1780, James Madison 
observed, regarding the Articles of Confederation, that “the nature and extent of the 
Union was determined by the circumstances of the crisis, rather than by any accurate 
delineation of the general authority” (Madison 6: 375).  As the war against Britain 
wound down and less unified support was necessary, the states routinely did not comply 
with Congress (i.e., the only branch of national government established by the Articles 
of Confederation).  As Jack Greene (1986) notes,  
“[i]n the early modern British Empire the peripheries had found 
themselves on the defensive against the aggressive power of the center; 
under the Articles, it was precisely the opposite: the center found itself 
without sufficient authority to preserve the general interests of the United 
States against the power of the several states.  (181) 
 
Consequently, the factious interests of the states threatened to undermine the hard fought 
victory of the American Revolution. 
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The Congress of the Articles of Confederation, remarked Connecticut delegate Jesse 
Root, “ ‘[h]aving no permanent funds in its possession, nor the means of establishing 
any…[the] sovereign power of war and peace must feel itself weak and prevent or defeat 
almost every measure however necessary and render the execution languid, tardy, and 
oft times wholly abortive’ ” (Greene 1986,182).  Without the sovereign power to govern 
war and peace, Congress (a king-in-parliament approach whereby the executive 
functions, judicial, and legislative functions were combined in one branch) lacked the 
ability to properly defend the United States from foreign adversaries and meddling as 
well as from rebel states.  Alexander Hamilton observed of the states under the Articles 
of Confederation that  
‘[each state was] more disposed to advance its own authority upon the 
ruins of the Confederacy, than to make any improper concessions in its 
favour…[the] excess[ive]…spirit of liberty which…made the particular 
states show a jealousy of all power not in their hands…[the] extreme 
jealousy of power…[led the states to pursue] monopolizing all power in 
themselves.’ (Greene 1986, 184) 
 
The states’ individual ambitions paired with Congress’ inability to enforce its own 
mandates for requisitions and revenue led to a disastrous constitutional experiment that 
precipitated the creation and ratification of the US Constitution. 
 
Some historians, like Arthur Bestor, claim that the Articles of Confederation prove that 
the founding generation of the United States wanted the powers of war and peace “to be 
arrived at through legislative deliberation—the very antithesis of the idea of vesting the 
power of war and peace in executive hands” (Bestor (1974) 527, 568).  The frequency 
among state constitutions of powers of war and peace invested into the executive (even 
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with some privy council) as well as the ultimate unitary, independent executive adopted 
by the Framers and ratified by the American people provides enough evidence to 
discredit this opinion.  John Yoo further adds that the combination of judicial, executive, 
and legislative functions that characterized the Congress of the Articles of the 
Confederation does not yield accurate evidence toward Bestor’s claim—extraordinary 
sampling does not accurately prove an argument.  Chief Justice John Marshall described 
the Articles of Confederation as a “league; and congress was a corps of ambassadors, to 
be recalled at the will of their masters” (Marshall (1970) 155, 199).  The Congress of the 
Articles of Confederation was not a semi-perfect constitutional arrangement that would 
be marginally altered in the US Constitution.  According to Yoo, this Congress did not 
have powers normal for a legislature: “Congress did not have powers that the 
revolutionaries normally associated with a legislature, such as the authority to regulate 
trade or to levy taxes—powers that remained with individual states” (76).  The Articles 
of Confederation had effectively localized sovereignty within each state while leaving 
the Congress little authority to fulfill its obligation to manage national defenses and 
conduct international relations.  In this light, the substantive changes to the Articles of 
Confederation embodied in the US Constitution are monumental: the national 
government was given the sovereign authority to enforce its laws and levy the revenues 
necessary to fulfill its foreign affairs duties 
 
The issue of declaring war was addressed in the Articles of Confederation in a manner 
contrary to contemporary arguments.  No explicit grant of declaring war was mentioned 
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in the Articles of Confederation, but Article VI states, “No state shall engage in any war 
without the consent of the united states in congress assembled, unless such state be 
actually invaded by enemies…” (Rossiter 1999, 535).  Using Article VI, John Yoo 
reaffirms his belief that whatever was not utilized by the Framers of the US Constitution 
but readily available to them should be not be positively considered as a means of 
defining the term in question:  
If the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had wanted to prohibit 
the president from initiating hostilities with another nation, they could 
have borrowed Article Vi and adjusted it to apply to the federal executive 
as well.  Article VI further suggests that the revolutionaries understood 
the declaration of war’s core purpose to be one relevant to international 
law…In short, the declaration of war clothed what would have been an 
illegal act by the states—sending warships against another nation—with a 
legal status in international law.  (77) 
 
First, Yoo points out that the Framers did not choose to limit the executive’s capacity to 
initiate hostilities.  The declaration of war, granted to Congress under the US 
Constitution, would affect the international status of the United States’ military action 
rather than prohibit the executive’s power to commence military action.  Keeping in line 
with British constitutional tradition, the executive would utilize his prerogative to initiate 
and direct hostilities while the legislature would exercise its prerogative of controlling 
the funding for military operations:  
British practice also underscored the irrelevance of the declaration of war 
to the balance of war powers between Crown and Parliament…In fact, in 
the many wars fought after the Restoration (the Second and Third Anglo-
Dutch Wars, King William’s War, the War of the Spanish Succession, the 
War of the Austrian Succession, and the Seven Years’ War), England 
declared war only once before or at the commencement of hostilities.  
(51) 
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Despite revolutionary rhetoric regarding the dismantling of any executive prerogatives, 
the war powers remained largely in the hands of the executive even in state constitutions 
during the Executive Interregnum.   
 
The contemporary debate over the American president’s war powers has also had a 
lengthy history.  “The United States has only declared war five times: during the War of 
1812, the Mexican-American War of 1848, the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the 
two World Wars.  Yet the United States has committed military forces into hostilities 
abroad at least 125 times in the Constitution’s 207-year history” (12).  The history of 
American war reveals that a congressional declaration of war is not the norm, rather the 
executive’s prerogative to engage in military action.  Although Congress could have 
refused to grant the funding required by the executive to wage war, it has never done so.  
The pre-Constitution history and post-Constitution history of the declaration of war 
reveals a 300-year tradition from British to American Constitutionalism of executive 
power to initiate and command military operations with the financial support of the 
legislature.  But the inability of the Congress under the Articles of Confederation to raise 
the revenue and forces necessary to enforce its 1783 Treaty with Britain as well as 
defend  its western outposts helped precipitate the cries for a new constitutional system. 
Legislative abuses 
By 1787 the inefficiency and impotence of the Articles of Confederation created the 
necessity for a new form of government, only accomplished under a new constitution. 
 
James Madison, perhaps the most influential force on the drafting of the US 
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Constitution, paid very close attention to constitutional experiments that had occurred 
during the decade after the Declaration of Independence.  His greatest contribution to 
American constitutionalism, the theory of faction, revolved around a central theme of the 
Constitution: securing individual rights.  According to Jack Rakove (1996), Madison 
depart from the traditional thought that the legislature was responsible for protecting 
individual rights: “The crucial departure in [Madison’s] thinking, however, occurred 
after 1785, and it involved asking why, in a republic, the purposeful decision of the 
legislature posed a greater threat to rights than did capricious acts of the executive” 
(313).  Madison’s theory of faction acknowledged that the legislature could act as a 
worse tyrant than a single executive, and Madison believed that “the problem of rights 
was no longer to protect the people from the government but to defend minorities and 
individuals against popular majorities acting through Government” (313).   
 
Madison’s contribution proved wearisome because it questioned “the fundamental 
principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in such Governments are 
the safest Guardians both of public good and of private rights” (353-354).  His analysis 
of state economic legislation and Shay’s Rebellion revealed that the security of private 
property rights was in jeopardy.  In his 1787 “Vices on the Political System of the 
United States,” Madison (1906) outlines his fear of legislative tyranny among the states:  
3.  Violations of the Law of Nations and of Treaties.  From the number of 
Legislatures…irregularities of this kind must frequently happen…The 
Treaty of peace—the treaty with France—the treaty with Holland have 
each been violated…4.  Trespasses of the States on the Rights of Each 
Other…Paper money, installments of debt, occlusion of Courts, making 
property a legal tender, may likewise be deemed aggressions on the rights 
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of other States…11.  Injustice of the Laws of States…their injustice 
betrays a defect still more alarming…because it brings into question the 
fundamental principle of republican Government, that the majority who 
rule…are the safest Guardians both of public Good and of private rights.  
(Madison 2: 361-369) 
 
State legislatures proved a greater threat to economic rights such as contract and private 
property through the passage of debtor relief laws than the executive.  Madison 
recognized that a constitutional union under a federal government would be required to 
prevent destructive economic competition between the states, especially for trade with 
other nations.  The dilemma of protecting economic rights demonstrated to Madison that 
the legislative possessed elastic powers that had the potential to engulf individual rights.   
 
Madison’s analysis provided the model for his agenda at the Constitutional Convention: 
the protection of individual rights against factious majorities (Rakove 314-316).  
Madison’s contributions to the drafting of the US Constitution at the Constitutional 
Convention centered largely on controlling the dangerous possibilities that could only 
arise from the legislature, and it was through the abuses of the state legislatures that 
Madison had learned to fear them.  In Federalist No. 10, Madison echoes his “Vices of 
the Political System of the United States” by listing his grievances with the state 
legislatures enabling the oppression of minority rights: “A rage for paper money, for an 
abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked 
project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member 
of it…” (Rossiter 79). 
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Madison believed that the legislature had the potential to wield a great abuse to 
individual rights, greater than the executive; but he also determined at what level the 
legislative would prove most dangerous.  Madison’s theory of faction determined the 
possibility for faction as inversely proportionally to the population: the greater the 
population, the less chance of faction.  The greatest possibility of faction lay within the 
individual states.  Madison’s chief cause throughout the framing of the Constitution was 
to provide the national legislature an unlimited veto over state legislation.  Madison saw 
the states’ disregard of their declarations of rights prior to the Constitution; thus, he 
believed that only a national veto would suffice in protecting individual liberties.  
Madison’s goal of achieving a national veto over state legislatures contradicted the 
revolutionary sentiments about localized sovereignty (and would in some senses 
contradict his states’ rights stance with the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican party).  
This apparent contradiction or, rather, turn in political philosophy demonstrates the fear 
of the legislature as being greater than that of the executive. 
 
Others in the founding generation had recognized that states and their legislatures had 
become dangerous to the United States under the Articles of Confederation.  John Jay 
wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1786 regarding the problems arising in the states: “A 
reluctance to taxes, an impatience of government, a rage for property and little regard to 
the means of acquiring it, together with a desire of equality in all things, seem to actuate 
the mass of those who are uneasy in their circumstances” (John Adams 1850-56, 1: 165).  
Samuel Osgood wrote to John Adams on similar matters in 1786: “The federal 
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government seems to be as near a crisis as it is possible…The State governments are 
weak and selfish enough, and they will of course annihilate the first…It is said that the 
insurgents [Shays’ rebellion] have two objectives in view; one, to reduce their state debt 
and those securities given by the United States…the other; to annihilate private debts” 
(Kurland and Lerner 1987, 165).  The states individually and corporately faced large 
unpaid debt that had accumulated from the Revolutionary War.  The weight of this debt 
frustrated foreign relations with foreign creditors such as France.  
 
Populist movements within the states (e.g., Shays’ rebellion) had sought to pass debtor 
relief laws that would have eliminated private debt accumulated individually during the 
Revolutionary War, especially among small farmers.  Classist tensions emerged and 
populist majorities that sought to abridge the minority rights of debt holders and 
landowners were trampling upon individual liberties within the state legislatures.  
Madison’s theory of faction and the well-documented concerns of other members of the 
founding generation demonstrate that the legislative branch hosted their greatest fears of 
government abuses of individual liberties.  The Executive Interregnum had officially 
ended in mid-1780s as fears of the abuses of the executive gave way to fears of the 
abuses of the legislature.   
 
The anti-executive rhetoric of the revolution had been proven less factual by the mid-
1780s than pure rhetoric.  Even in the historical context of the metropolitan-colonial 
relations of 1680s-1770s, the legislature was a necessary element to subjugate individual 
53 
rights.  Early experiments in American constitutionalism (1776-1787) had revealed that 
the legislature posed the greatest threat to individual liberties rather than the executive.  
The foreign affairs powers of the executive were diluted in many state constitutions and 
the Articles of Confederation, but the traditional substantive authority of the executive 
over foreign affairs was maintained to a degree despite varying structural arrangements 
that sought to dilute the executive’s independence and unitary nature.  Ultimately, the 
US Constitution would reject such dilution and restore the executive to its primary 
authority albeit not exclusive power over foreign affairs. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RATIFICATION OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER 
 
After the Constitution was completed at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, state 
ratification debates began in earnest as Federalists in every state sought to adopt the 
Constitution as swift as possible.  Ten state legislatures had called for elections to the 
special ratification conventions by the end of 1787.  The newspapers were filled with 
political commentary from Federalists and Anti-Federalists praising and lamenting the 
virtues and vices of the new Constitution.  Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James 
Madison led the Federalist debate through their publication of the Federalist Papers 
from 1787 to 1788, which offers extensive political theory justifying the necessity, form, 
and inception of the Constitution.  In Federalist No. 15 Hamilton illuminates the 
deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation: some of the greatest deficiencies deal with 
foreign affairs and common defense both of which are largely remedied by the 
institution of the presidency.   
 
Some of the greatest deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation according to the 
Federalists were the lack of domestic enforcement for national laws as well as disunity 
in foreign affairs.  The new Constitution sought to unify the United States foreign affairs 
in the locus of the general government—states could no longer conduct their own 
foreign affairs without the approval of Congress. The President was vested with “the 
executive Power”: a general grant of power that would include all executive functions 
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not otherwise prohibited or qualified.  The new Constitution placed the President as 
chief executive and commander-in-chief of the armed forces and navy—responsible for 
directing the common defense of the United States.  The President, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, was responsible for directing foreign relations through the making 
of treaties and the appointment of ambassadors. 
 
Yet the future of the American Presidency was unclear to the American public.  Few 
would have predicted its evolution, especially during the 20th Century, but the ratifying 
conventions of 1878-1879 built on the tradition of executive power as exercised by their 
former king and more recently by state governors—as this thesis has disclosed.  The new 
nation that would be formed under the Constitution needed a chief executive capable of 
managing foreign affairs with a unity and independence that would preserve the efficacy 
and prestige of the office at home and abroad.  The references to the President during the 
ratification debate era (1787-1789) support the general argument of this paper that the 
President was to have primary direction over war and treaty powers but not exclusive 
control. 
 
First, Hamilton cites the large amounts of debt to foreign as well as domestic creditors 
that were incurred as a result of the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783): “Do we 
owe debts to our citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preservation of 
our political existence?  These remain without any satisfactory provision for their 
discharge” (Rossiter 101).  Second and most important, Hamilton declares the American 
56 
states susceptibility to foreign aggression and interference, especially in matters of 
commerce: “Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression?...Are we entitled 
by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi?  Spain 
excludes us from it” (102).  Many Federalists were concerned with the Spanish control 
of the Mississippi River because it hindered western expansion and commerce.  
Hamilton continues: “Is commerce of importance to national wealth?  Ours is at the 
lowest point of declension.  Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard 
against foreign encroachments?  The imbecility of our government forbids them to treat 
with us” (102).  The loose confederation under the Articles of Confederation could not 
protect and support the domestic and international commerce of the States because it 
lacked the naval power and general military resources to secure and enforce American 
property from foreign aggression.  The naval threat of Spain and Great Britain loomed 
large in early American history, and American diplomacy under the Articles of 
Confederation was not taken seriously by foreign nations such as Spain and Great 
Britain.  For the Federalists, the necessity of ratifying the Constitution was strongest for 
reason of common defense. 
 
Third, Hamilton claims that the general government under the Articles of Confederation 
is “destitute of energy” necessary to enforce its mandates to states for quotas and 
requisitions to maintain defense, relieve debt, and regulate commerce (103).  Skeptical 
of the states’ loose affiliation to each other, Hamilton cites the dangerous history of 
“good faith” alliances: “…giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind how 
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little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the 
obligations of good faith…” (104).  In Federalist No. 21, Hamilton reiterates that the 
future of the American states depends on an effective general government with greater 
means of enforcement than the general government of the Articles of Confederation: 
“The peace of society and the stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy 
of the precautions adopted on this head” (136).  According to the Federalists, the states 
could not expect to retain all sovereignty in exchange for the treaty of common defense, 
which was most central, albeit impotently executed, to the Articles of Confederation.  In 
order to cement the Union of the 13 American states, the Federalists believed that a new 
general government with enumerated powers over all of the states was necessary.  The 
necessity of a general government with the ability to enforce its own laws depended on 
the authority of congress to make laws and the authority of the executive to enforce 
them. 
The Anti-Federalists, the major opponents to the new Constitution, feared the 
unitary executive as a reincarnation of the British King.  Cato, a famous Anti-Federalist, 
wrote in 1787 that the presidential prerogatives, or powers, in war and peace are the 
same as King George III:  
[F]or though it may be asserted that the king of Great Britain has the 
express power of making peace or war, yet he never thinks it prudent so 
to do without the advice of his parliament from whom he is to do derive 
his support, and therefore these powers, in both president and king, are 
substantially the same: he is the generalissimo of the nation, and of 
course, has the command and control of the army, navy and militia…Will 
not the exercise of these powers therefore tend either to the establishment 
of a vile and arbitrary aristocracy, or monarchy?  (Storing 1981, 3: 500) 
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The Anti-Federalist arguments as represented by Cato seem to assume that (1) the 
President is to be unitary, and (2) the President is the primary operator of matters of war 
and peace.  Cato’s complaints against the President’s power (although his letter 
addresses more than just the foreign affairs power) acknowledge the primary albeit not 
exclusive capacity of the President to direct war and peace.  Present day historians and 
legal scholars who suggest that the President was not the primary authority over foreign 
affairs would have to blatantly ignore one of the Anti-Federalists’ major concerns with 
the creation of the American Presidency as embodied in the 1787 Constitution.  
 
Patrick Henry, a famous opponent of adopting the Constitution and an Anti-Federalist 
spokesman, voiced his fear in the power of the American President and the institution’s 
resemblance to the British Crown during the Virginia Convention in 1788.  His adroit 
demagoguery was extreme in its interpretation of the American President, but the theme 
of his statements on the American President acknowledge its primacy over matters of 
war and peace.   
 If your American chief be a man of ambition and abilities, how easy it is 
for him to render himself absolute!  The army is in his hands…I would 
rather infinitely—and I am sure most of this Convention are of the same 
opinion—have a king, lord, and commons, than a government so replete 
with such insupportable evils…the President, in the field, at the head of 
the army, can prescribe the terms on which he shall reign master, so far 
that it will puzzle any American ever to get his neck from under the 
galling yoke…Away with your President!  [W]e shall have a king: the 
army will salute him monarch: your militia will leave you, and assist in 
making him king, and fight against you… (Elliot 1888, 3: 512-513) 
 
Henry’s claims about the American President resonate with Cato’s fear that the 
American President would exercise an absolute authority like the despotic kings 
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common to European history.  The crucial point of note is that such absolutism would 
require command over the military—a key war power—to initiate and direct military 
action.  Both Cato and Henry affirm the common Anti-Federalist belief that the 
American President’s primary authority over the war power in order to voice their fear 
of presidential absolutism.   
 
Despite Anti-Federalist claims that the American President was an exact replica of the 
British monarch and bound to absolutism, Federalist James Wilson at the Pennsylvania 
Ratifying Convention (December 1787) noted a fundamental difference between the 
American and British Executives circa 1787.  The republican character of the American 
executive made the President responsive to the general public through elections and 
impeachment whereas the British Crown was incorruptible and could not be truly held 
responsible by law.   Wilson states, “The next good quality that I remark is, that the 
executive authority is one…that this officer is placed high, and is possessed of power far 
from being contemptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from 
being above the laws, he is amenable to them…by impeachment” (Elliot 3: 501).  
Wilson’s praise of the unitary executive strongly affirms the republican character of the 
American President.  This republican character serves as a fundamental distinction of the 
American President from the British Crown (c. 1787) even though both shared a similar 
purview over foreign affairs—powers of war and peace.  The American Revolution’s 
republican character was echoed in the institution of the American President by virtue of 
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his or her direct connection to the citizenry and the laws that everyone under the domain 
of the United States had to follow—no exceptions. 
 
The President’s authority over powers of peace—that is, treaties—as contained in 
Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution give the President primary authority to make and 
conclude treaties with the “advice and consent of the Senate.”  At the Pennsylvania 
Ratification Convention in December of 1787, James Wilson explicates his 
understanding of the President’s peace powers.  First, Wilson notes the distribution of 
the treaty power between the Senate and the President.  Wilson states:  
We are told that the share which the Senate have in making treaties is 
exceptionable; but here they are also under a check, by a constituent part 
of the government, and nearly the immediate representative of the 
people—I mean the President of the United States.  They [the Senate] can 
make no treaty without his consent.  The same observation applies in the 
appointment of officers.  Every officer must be nominated solely and 
exclusively by the President.  (Elliot 4: 40) 
 
Wilson’s statement comments of the check that the President has on the Senate, and he 
views the President as the most direct representative of the public partaking in the 
process of making treaties since the House of Representatives is excluded.  Wilson notes 
the different characteristics of a treaty as compared with legislation:  
But though treaties are to have the force of laws, they are in some 
important respects very different than other acts of legislation.  In making 
laws, our own consent alone is necessary.  In forming treaties, the 
concurrence of another power becomes necessary.  Treaties…are truly 
contracts, or compacts, between the different states, nations, or 
princes…[treaties] originate differently from laws.  They are made by 
equal parties, and each has half of the bargain to make; they will be made 
between us and powers at the distance of three thousand miles.  (4: 40) 
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Since treaties involve (at least) two independent countries, the treaty making process 
requires at least one government representative from each country to negotiate in the 
interests of their respective country.  In terms of republican principles, the President is 
best suited to represent and direct treaty negotiations (even through a proxy such as an 
ambassador or the Secretary of State) of the whole American citizenry.  The Senate acts 
as a check on the President’s actions, but the Senate cannot act outside of the purview of 
the President’s direction. 
 
Wilson notes that the Senate cannot act without the consent of the President, but Wilson 
clarifies the possible confusion that could arise from his contrapositive of the actual text 
in the Constitution as cited earlier: the President is the primary director of treaties by 
virtue of his direction over the appointment of officers primarily engaged in diplomacy 
(i.e., the State Department or diplomatic corps).  The peace power of treaty making 
blends executive and legislative functions but not in a way that grants the Senate and 
President equal power (just as the House of Representatives does not have the same 
authority over directing war as the President does even though the House of 
Representatives are the only body capable of funding the war).   
 
Treaties are to be enacted as supreme laws of the land: a legislative function.  Treaties 
must be negotiated by the “diplomatic corps” (i.e., what we know as the State 
Department), which is under the direction President by virtue of his sole appointment 
power to appoint ambassadors and other officials involved in treaty making: an 
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executive function (4: 40).  Wilson explains that the legislative role is necessary to fulfill 
the domestic legal implications of a treaty, and he explains that the executive role is 
necessary and primary given its direct responsibility for foreign affairs as well as the 
enforcement of treaties at home and abroad (or at the very least seeking remedy for 
international violations of such treaties).  Wilson closes his exposition on the distribution 
of the treaty making power of the executive—listed under the executive article with the 
Senate as a qualification on the general grant of power to the executive—by stating, 
“Neither the President nor the Senate, solely, can complete a treaty; they are checks 
upon each other, and are so balanced as to produce security to the people” (4: 40).   
 
The first test of the executive’s foreign affairs power 
After the US Constitution was conceived at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the 
Ratification debates did not officially give birth to the Constitution until 1788 when New 
Hampshire became the ninth state to approve the Constitution; but it was not until after 
the Virginia and New York Ratification conventions passed the Constitution that same 
year that the life of the Constitution was given its full power.  The first presidential 
administration began with George Washington in 1789, which lasted until 1797 when 
John Adams succeeded him.  President Washington formulated the role of the 
presidency with little specific guidance: he crafted the role of statesman and fulfilled the 
Revolutionary Spirit’s desire for a Patriot-King who would put the good of the nation 
before his own.   
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In 1793, France declared war on Great Britain and Holland, already embroiled with 
Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia.  President Washington took a bold step by issuing the 
Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, which annulled America’s obligation to aid France in 
war under Article Eleven of the 1778 Treaty of Alliance with France.  President 
Washington determined that the “duty and interest of the United States require, that they 
[the United States] should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct 
friendly and impartial towards the belligerent Powers…” (Frisch 1).  Washington’s 
pragmatism—staying out of war avoided disrupting vital commerce with England and 
Spain since both had strong commercial navies, and staying out of war prevented the 
United States from engaging in a war it could not afford financially, materially, and/or in 
terms of human capital—was not well received by the entire public.  Many believed that 
Washington was being ungrateful for France’s assistance during the Revolutionary War, 
and some political leaders, especially those of Jeffersonian inclination, saw 
Washington’s action as a excessive and unconstitutional exercise of executive authority.  
Alexander Hamilton believed otherwise. 
 
In June of 1793, Hamilton published his first letter under the pseudonym Pacificus in 
defense of Washington’s exercise of executive authority.  In response to Hamilton’s 
series of Pacificus letters, Thomas Jefferson wrote James Madison expressing his 
outrage at Hamilton: “For god’s sake, my dear Sir, take up your pen, select [Hamilton’s] 
most striking heresies, and cut him to pieces in the face of the public…Never in my 
opinion, was so calamitous an appointment made, as that of the present minister of F. 
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here [i.e., Hamilton]” (54).  Jefferson coaxed Madison into developing a series of 
rebuttals to Hamilton’s Pacificus letters under the pseudonym of Helvidius.  The 
Pacificus-Helvidius debate that ensued frames the context for the first major 
constitutional battle between the executive and the legislative in the direction of foreign 
affairs.  Hamilton’s broad construction of executive powers was in stark contrast to 
Madison’s strict construction.  This conflict was the first of many in defining the 
distribution of powers in foreign affairs, and the arguments on each side have set the 
tone for the past 218 years.  These arguments will provide the basis for the concluding 
arguments of this research. 
 
Hamilton’s “Pacificus I” defines the major objections to Washington’s neutrality 
proclamation and then responds to each with each letter—this first letter provides the 
foundation for his view on the bounds of power that the Constitution’s has vested in the 
executive.  First, Hamilton addresses the objection “That the Proclamation was without 
authority” (Frisch 9).  Hamilton dissects the accepted meaning of the day for a neutrality 
proclamation as a means of understanding what agency in the United States’ government 
had the proper authority to issue the proclamation of neutrality:  
The true nature & design of such an act is—to make known to the powers 
at War and to the Citizens of the Country, whose Government does the 
Act that such country is in the condition of a Nation at Peace with the 
belligerent parties, and under no obligations of Treaty, to become an 
associate in the war…[the proclamation’s] main object and effect are to 
prevent the Nation being immediately responsible for acts done by its 
citizens, without the privity or connivance of the Government, in 
contravention to the principles of neutrality.  (9-10) 
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According to the laws of Nations (i.e., international law), Hamilton believes that the 
United States is not obligated to engage in war on account of its treaty with France.  
Hamilton stresses that by issuing the Proclamation, Washington simply sought to 
maintain a peaceful status with all nations, which would not preclude the United States 
from fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty with France.  The United States had a 
right to annul the eleventh article of the Treaty with France since the treaty was 
defensive and France’s actions toward its opponents were offensive, but the United 
States was still obligated under international law (that is, the law of Nations) to fulfill all 
other obligations of the Treaty that did not threaten the United States’ status of peace.  
Additionally, the proclamation declared that all United States’ citizens that violated this 
proclamation by non-neutral (i.e., aggressive actions siding with one or more of the 
parties engaged in war) actions would be subject to punishment under United States’ law 
and not guaranteed the assistance of the United States should they be captured and/or 
prosecuted by other nations engaged in the war.   
 
Second, Hamilton explicates which department of government is most suitable to issue 
the Neutrality Proclamation by examining each department’s function in light of the 
definition of a neutrality proclamation as stated before.  Hamilton states that the 
legislature “is not the organ of intercourse between the UStates and Foreign Nations” 
(11).  Since the Constitution does not charge the legislative department with the task of 
interpreting and making treaties, the legislature cannot be the proper source of a making 
and interpreting treaties according to Hamilton.  Since the judiciary department has “no 
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concern with pronouncing upon the external political relations of Treaties between 
Government and Government,” Hamilton believes that the judiciary is least suited to 
interpreting and making treaties.  Finally, Hamilton turns to the executive department 
and declares it the proper organ of “intercourse between the Nation and foreign 
Nations—as the interpreter of the National Treaties in those cases in which the Judiciary 
is not competent, that is in the cases between Government and Government” (11).  
Furthermore, Hamilton states that treaties naturally fall into the executive’s primary duty 
to execute the laws with the “Power which is charged with the command and application 
of Public Force” (11).   
 
Hamilton’s main argument and mode of constitutional interpretation—broad 
construction—emerges in the final half of “Pacificus I.”  Hamilton believed that Article 
II of the Constitution, which grants executive powers and duties, was a general grant of 
executive power to the President with some qualifications or exceptions.  The difference 
by which the Constitution granted legislative power versus executive power was key to 
Hamilton’s interpretation:  
The different mode of expression employed in the constitution I  regard 
to…the Legislative and Executive serves to confirm this inference.  In the 
article which grants the legislative powers…the expressions are—‘All 
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
UStates’; in that which grants the Executive Power the expressions 
are…‘The EXECUTIVE POWER shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.  (12) 
 
The general grant of executive power versus the limited enumeration of legislative 
power was a fundamental constitutional guidepost that enabled Hamilton to link the 
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making and interpreting of treaties to the executive power of the president—with the 
qualification of the advice and consent of the Senate.  In response to criticism that the 
Constitution limited executive powers to those explicitly mentioned in Article II, 
Hamilton argued that the “difficulty of a complete and perfect specification of all the 
cases of Executive authority would naturally dictate the use of general terms” (12).   
 
Criticisms that the legislature’s power to declare war demonstrated a limit on the 
executive’s foreign affairs powers did not bother Hamilton’s constitutional construction 
of the executive’s powers.  He responded that Executive is not prohibited to decide 
whether the nation is under obligations to make war or not “in the execution of its own 
functions” (13).  The executive’s ability to interpret treaties necessarily falls into his/her 
domain since enforcing treaty obligations is one of the executive’s duties.  Furthermore, 
Hamilton argues that the Constitution explicitly mentions the President’s powers of 
appointment and receiving foreign dignitaries as a signification of the President’s 
primary power over foreign affairs—in this case, treaties.  Hamilton uses the example of 
the President’s power to recognize or not recognize the foreign dignitaries and their 
respective nations: this establishes a linkage between the power to recognize foreign 
nations and their representatives and interpreting treaties.   
 
One of Hamilton’s famous contributions to constitutional interpretation is the idea of 
concurrent powers.  Hamilton believed that the three branches of government with their 
respective spheres of power intersected in particular instances.  For example, “treaties,” 
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according to Hamilton, “can only be made by the President and Senate, their activity 
may be continued or suspended by the President alone” (15).  Although the Senate and 
the President both participate in making treaties, the distribution of power is not strictly 
speaking equal: the President directs the treaty making process and can terminate the 
treaty making process.   
 
This concurrence of power is an embodiment of the checks and balances central to 
American government (contrary to Madison’s retort as Helvidius that concurrent powers 
was a confusing doctrine).  In response to criticism that the executive was interfering 
with the legislature’s power to declare war—which as determined earlier in the paper 
was extremely limited to the domestic legal condition rather than the process of directing 
and making war—Hamilton argues that an executive action, such as interpreting a treaty, 
that affects the preconditions under which the legislature makes declarations of war does 
not preclude the executive from those actions.  Hamilton gives the example that if the 
treaty with France had been offensive as well as defensive, the United States’ legislature 
would have been required to declare war, but Washington’s interpretation of the treaty 
prevented the legislature from having to fulfill that obligation.  Although the executive 
may not be capable of declaring war, the executive can establish “an antecedent state of 
things” according to Hamilton (15).  This idea that the executive could establish an 
antecedent state of things embodies the consequences of Hamilton’s concurrent powers 
doctrine.   
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Hamilton confirms the practice of the President’s establishment of an antecedent state of 
things when President Washington entertained the Minister from the new Republic of 
France.  President Washington’s reception of the Minister from the newly formed regime 
was a formal recognition on behalf of the United States of the new regime’s status as a 
nation, but, as Hamilton points out, President Washington received the Minister and 
thereby formally recognized the new Republic of France “without having consulted the 
Senate; thought that body is connected with him in the making of Treaties, and thought 
the consequences of his act of reception is to give operation to the Treaties heretofore 
made with that Country…” (15-16).  Hamilton notes the inconsistency with which the 
critics of Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation ignore this example while decrying his 
interpretation of the treaty on the sole basis of the legislature’s right to declare war.  The 
legislature’s right to declare war, which is an exception out of the general grant of 
executive power, does not prohibit the President from interpreting the treaty with France 
nor from maintaining a neutral position in order to preserve peace.  Rather, the executive 
is charged with the duty to execute the treaty as he sees fit until the legislature brings the 
nation into a state of war.  In light of the historical context of the right to declare war as 
previously discussed in this research, Washington’s critics used an expansive view of the 
legislature’s right to declare war to justify their criticisms. Hamilton believed that 
president had the primary power of foreign affairs in war and in peace.  
 
Madison, on the other hand, employed a strict construction of the executive powers 
granted under the Constitution.  Madison begins “Helvidius I” by confronting 
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Hamilton’s belief that the actions of declaring war and making treaties were executive in 
nature.  Second, Madison points out Hamilton’s broad constitutional construction of 
executive powers—that the executive was given a general grant of power with specific 
qualifications or exceptions.  Madison believes Hamilton’s mode of constitutional 
interpretation is flawed, but Madison’s meticulous style allows him to build up to this 
conclusion by looking to three major sources of authority or evidence.  First, Madison 
examines respected authors on public affairs such as Vattel and Locke.  Paraphrasing 
from the works of Vattel, Wolfius, and Burlamaqui, Madison states that these 
authoritative authors believed that “the powers to declare war, to conclude peace, and to 
form alliances, [were] among the highest acts of sovereignty; of which the legislative 
power must at least be an integral and preeminent part” (Frisch 58).  Madison believed 
that these authors statements on the true nature of the actions of declaring war, 
concluding peace, and treaty making demanded that the legislative have a primary role 
in such activities.  If true, such a definition of declaring war and treaty making would 
render Hamilton’s definition void. 
 
Madison then turns a critical eye toward Locke and Montesquieu’s definition of the 
nature of declaring war and treaty making.  Madison automatically discounts their status 
as an authoritative source given that both were “warped by a regard to the particular 
government of England, to which one of them owed allegiance; and the other professed 
an admiration bordering on idolatry” (58).  Madison advocates for Montesquieu’s strict 
separation of powers within the government by function, which is later used to justify his 
71 
aversion to Hamilton’s concurrent powers doctrine.  Madison then cites Locke’s 
discussion of the federative power as being separate from the executive as a means of 
undermining Hamilton’s reasoning, but Madison’s interpretation of Locke is terribly 
short-sighted and corrupted by Madison’s own disdain for Locke’s loyalty to the British 
Crown. 
 
John Locke’s twelfth chapter of his Second Treatise of Civil Government explicates the 
nature of legislative versus executive power, and Locke adds the federative power to the 
list.  Locke stated that the federative power encompassed the “power of war and peace, 
leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and communities without 
the commonwealth” (Locke 1946, 73).  Locke goes onto to explain the almost 
inseparable connection between the executive and federative powers.  For Locke, 
executive power was first and foremost the “execution of municipal laws of the society 
within itself upon all that are parts of it,” which is purely domestic enforcement.  Then 
Locke defines the federative power as the “management of the security and interest of 
the public without, with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they 
[the executive power] are always almost united” (73).  Locke notes that his definition of 
executive power encompassed strictly domestic concerns whereas the federative power 
was the foreign version of the same responsibility of enforcement of international law as 
well as the common defense.  For Locke and his retrospective view of human history, 
the executive power was almost always conjoined with the federative power given their 
similarities of function only separated by the domestic and foreign spheres.  Furthermore 
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and most detrimental to Madison’s overarching argument, Locke notes the need for 
active management rather than positive law in dealing with the issues concerning the 
federative power, which Locke believed that the executive was more capable than the 
legislature to fulfill: “And though the federative power in the well or ill management of 
[the federative power] be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less 
capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws than the executive…” (73).   
 
Locke further states the impracticality and loss of efficiency that would result of from 
separating the executive and federative powers: 
Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every 
community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be 
separated and placed at the same time in the hands of distinct persons; for 
both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is 
almost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct 
and not subordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power 
should be placed in persons that might act separately, whereby the force 
of the public would be under different commands, which would be apt 
some time or other to cause disorder and ruin.  (73-74) 
 
Madison’s misleading statement that Locke did not believe that powers of war and peace 
(i.e., foreign affairs powers) to be executive in nature is corrected by a full treatment of 
Locke’s statements on the federative power.  Locke saw the federative power as a 
different category of power than the executive, but Locke’s definition of the federative 
power reveals that it was more of a foreign application of executive power than 
fundamentally separate from it.  The reason that Locke saw these two powers (federative 
and executive) as distinct but conjoined was that the federative dealt with a foreign 
sphere while the executive dealt with the domestic sphere, but both powers demanded 
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the same means of enforcement to fulfill their duties—that is, domestic and foreign 
enforcement agencies such as state militias, the armed forces, and other agencies with 
the explicit responsibility of enforcing law.  To separate these powers would prove 
disastrous according to Locke, which undermines Madison’s argument. 
 
After discussing authoritative authors on public affairs, Madison turned to the operation 
of the powers to declare war and make treaties.  He believed that since the actual, day-
to-day function of these powers failed to meet a purely executive definition (according to 
his interpretation of Hamilton’s standard) that they could not be executive and therefore 
had to, by nature, be characteristic of another department of government.  According to 
Madison, the proper definition of executive power was anything under the “natural 
province of the executive magistrate…to execute laws…” (Frisch 59).  Madison further 
states that since laws must preexist before they can be legislated, “a treaty is not an 
execution of laws: it does not presuppose the existence of laws.  It is on the contrary, to 
have itself the force of a law, and to be carried into execution, like all other laws, by the 
executive magistrate” (59).  Madison’s line of reasoning concluded in the idea that for 
the executive to have by nature a function such as treaty making would mean that the 
executive possesses an executive power: “In theory this an absurdity—in practice a 
tyranny” (59).   
 
Madison firmly believed that the treaty making power was legislative by nature rather 
than executive.   Hamilton and participants at the Constitutional Conventions, such as 
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James Wilson of Pennsylvania, disagreed with Madison’s interpretation because they 
believed that treaties were categorically different from traditional legislation for two 
reasons.  First, treaties may have the force of law but involve negotiations between (at 
least) two unique national governments.  Government to government treaties are a 
contract between the two unique governments and demand the equal consent of both 
governments.  Second, treaties originate differently than domestic laws since two unique 
governments are the source of the treaty.  Such treaty making demands negotiations 
between governments that is inherently a federative power, demanding the participation 
of the governmental agent capable of representing the nation as a whole: the American 
president, a representative of the whole population—the most republican of 
institutions—, is best suited to direct treaty negotiations.   
 
Madison furthers his operations reasoning by comparing treaty making powers with the 
power to declare war.  Since a declaration changes the domestic legal environment until 
that state of war ends, the act of declaring war is a legislative rather than executive act.  
Madison believes that the ability to change the domestic legal status of the nation should 
rest with the executive.  Hamilton on the other hand believes that the declaration of war 
is limited to the American legislature not by virtue of the legislative nature of such an act 
nor by the impact of the act—to change the domestic legal environment.  Rather, 
Hamilton believes that the legislature’s right to declare war has no impact on the 
executive’s ability to influence the antecedent state of things.  In fact, Hamilton claims 
that it is the executive’s  
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[duty]…to preserve Peace till war is declared; and in fulfilling that duty, 
it must necessarily possess a right of judging what is the nature of the 
obligations which the treaties of the Country impose on the Government; 
and when in pursuance of this right it has concluded that there is nothing 
in them inconsistent with a state of neutrality, it becomes its province and 
its duty to enforce the laws incident to that state of the Nation.  (13-14) 
 
Although treaties can have an impact on the domestic legal environment (i.e., the 
antecedent state of things), Hamilton denies Madison’s argument that such an impact 
makes treaty making an inherently legislative act.   
 
As if to provide a safety net to his argument, Madison further asserts that if his argument 
about the operations of war and treaty powers is not purely legislative, the legislature is 
the department of government most qualified to have primary authority over these 
powers.  In addition to this assertion Madison equivocates “declaring war” and “making 
war”—intentionally or unintentionally, I do not know.  Such an equivocation would be 
proven incorrect by the historical context of British constitutionalism from which 
American constitutionalism was primarily derived and adapted, even if Madison refuses 
to believe it.   
 
Finally, Madison turns to the Constitution to disprove Hamilton’s claims of a general 
grant of executive power.  Madison first attacks Hamilton’s belief that the limited 
enumeration of powers to the legislative versus the general grant of power to the 
executive had significance.  Madison finds Hamilton’s “analogy” flawed on the basis 
that “we find that of declaring war expressly vested in the Congress, where every other 
legislative power is declared to be vested, and without any other qualification…The 
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constitutional idea of this power would seem…that it is of a legislative and not an 
executive nature” (60).  Madison’s statement indicates his belief that the Constitution 
would not put a legislative power among all executive powers or an executive power 
among all legislative powers.  Contrary to Hamilton’s idea of concurrent powers, 
Madison denies that the Constitution would be so confusing as to intermingle powers: 
“that kind of intermixture and consolidation of different powers, which would violate a 
fundamental principle in the organization of free governments” (61).  
 
Furthermore, Madison claims that it is imprudent to allow those who direct a war to “be 
proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded.  
They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, 
analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing 
from the power of enacting laws” (62).  Madison claims that the separation between the 
treaty making power and the American president’s clear power over war operations is 
analogous to the separation between the direction of war and its source of funding, but 
Madison’s claim is tenuous at best since the power of treaties has never had a history of 
being inherently legislative, especially when viewed through the lens of British and early 
American constitutionalism.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Anti-Executive rhetoric engorged the American public during the Revolutionary.  
Authors like Thomas Paine ignored British Parliament’s growing role as the 
primary constitutional arbiter in the decades leading up to 1776, and, as a result, 
the American public blamed the King for the meltdown of metropolitan-colonial 
relations.  Parliament had blatantly abandoned the republican principles that 
Americans so desperately fought to uphold, and the King was a complicit actor 
but certainly not the primary one.  By the mid-1780s in the wake of state 
constitutional experiments and the Articles of Confederation, the anti-executive 
rhetoric of the revolution was rendered as less than factual.  The American 
experience during the metropolitan-colonial relations with Britain of 1680-1776 
that the legislature was a necessary element to subjugate individual rights was 
repeated again during the late 1770s and early 1780s.  Early experiments in 
American constitutionalism during this period had revealed that the legislature 
posed a greater threat to individual liberties than the executive.   
 
The Ratification Debates marked the culmination of American constitutionalism over the 
previous century and served as the lifeblood and authority, derived from the people, of 
the Constitution.  These debates were founded upon the historical context of the 
executive’s foreign affairs power that had continuously developed from British 
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Constitutionalism to American Constitutionalism.  The US Constitution rejected the 
dilution of executive unity and power over foreign affairs that states had experimented 
with prior to 1787.  The Constitution restored the executive to its primary authority 
albeit not exclusive power over foreign affairs, and even the Anti-Federalists recognized 
this shift in power back to the executive since it was one of their primary concerns. 
 
President Washington conducted the first exercise of the executive’s new foreign affairs 
power in 1793 when he issued a neutrality proclamation to keep the US out of war with 
Europe because of its treaty with France.  Madison and Jefferson were enraged by 
Washington’s actions and sought to constrain the executive immediately, but Hamilton 
adeptly defended Washington’s position by looking at the language of the Constitution 
in light of the ratification debates and the continuous development from British to 
American constitutionalism.  The debate that took place between Hamilton and Madison 
in the Pacificus-Helvidius letters marked the beginning of a debate that has spanned two 
centuries.  Who is right?  This research shows that although both proponents of 
Hamilton and Madison have legitimate arguments, ultimately Hamilton’s argument finds 
itself closest to the original meaning of the Constitution’s foreign affairs power. 
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